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ABSTRACT
Zirker, Daniel G., M.A. Pall, 1976 Political Science
Politics and Institutionalized change* The Failure of 
Regional Development Planning in Northeat Brazil, 1961-
196M139 PP-)
Director* Dr. Leo Lott
This study was an attempt to explain the failure of re­
gional political and socio-economic planning in Northeast 
Brazil in the context of social science theories of politi­
cal development. The focus of the research was on the 
Northeast Development Superintendency, or the SUDENE, a 
Brazilian agency empowered in 1959 to enact sweeping in­
stitutional changes in the region.
The thesis is divided into three parts* the first is 
a representation of the extreme poverty and privation of 
the people of the region; the second is an analysis of the 
structure, function, and ultimate failure of the SUDENE; 
the third is a systems analysis of the relationship of the 
SUDENE and the United States Alliance for Progress foreign 
aid program. The latter includes summarization of rele­
vant theories of functionalism and political development 
in a comparative sense. Reference is made to basic works 
including those by David Apter, Samuel Huntington, Gabriel 
Almond, and Riordan Roett.
The conclusions of the thesis are as follows* first, 
that regional development programs cannot overcome poverty 
and privation in Brazil because these problems are not pri­
marily regional, and because regional political elites 
actively resist change on a regional level; second, that 
personalism in Brazilian political institutions consti­
tutes a serious impediment to lasting change; and third, 
that United States foreign assistance tends to compete 
with, rather than reinforce, programs of major political 
and socio-economic change in Northeast Brazil.
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PREFACE
Poverty and privation are persistent elements of 
the socio-economic environment of Northeast Brazil despite 
intensive efforts to eliminate them through regional devel­
opment programs initiated in the 1950s and 1960s.
This thesis will attempt to explain why government 
planning of political and economic development in North­
east Brazil has been, by and large, a failure. To do 
this, two factors which contribute to the inherent weak­
nesses of regional planning ventures will be considered 
and analyzed.
The first factor relates to the development and 
functions of the Superintend£ncia de Desenvolvimento do 
Nordeste, or the SUDENE— the organization with the primary 
responsibility for coordinating and administrating develop­
ment efforts in Northeast Brazil after I960. The analysis 
of the SUDENE will take into consideration not only its 
evolution as a government agency, but also its capacity 
to achieve both general goals, such as those just men­
tioned, and very specific goals, such as the stimulation 
of the "modernization" process at local and regional 
levels, and the transformation of those elements of
iv
V
Northeastern culture which basically resist change.
A second factor will involve the inability of 
regional development programs in general to achieve the 
national cooperation in Brazil that they require. This 
stems from the competition between modernizing elites of 
different regions for federal recognition and support, 
and the effectiveness of the south-central regional in­
terests in achieving this support to the exclusion of the 
interests in other regions.
The focus of this thesis will center on regional 
planning of social and political development in Northeast 
Brazil. Since planning efforts concerning this region 
have been substantially increased since I960, it is this 
time period which will receive the most attention.
A main endeavor of this thesis will be to define 
the specific branches and functions of the SUDENE, to es­
tablish a case study of the relationship between the 
SUDENE and other development agencies in the Northeast, 
and to articulate the structural shortcomings of the 
SUDENE in light of the drastic modifications that it has 
undergone since 1964,
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the resolution 
of widespread conditions of poverty and privation in the 
Northeast will be impossible as long as the interests of 
that area are treated as regional, and therefore as 
separate from those of the rest of Brazil. This idea is
based on the manifest inadequacy of past and present 
regional development programs in succeeding to any ap­
preciable degree in resolving either their specific goals, 
or the general problems of the Northeast. Furthermore, 
the hypothesis rests on the assumption that this condition 
originates from the existence of competition between the 
interests of regional modernizing elites in Brazil. Since 
development priorities for the Northeast contradict in 
many respects the immediate interests of the south-central 
regional elite, these priorities are not accorded the 
cooperation that they require. In short, regional plan­
ning in Brazil emanates from the seat of federal power, 
which is located near, and dominated by, the south-central 
region.
I am grateful to have worked in the development 
process in Northeast Brazil as a Peace Corps Volunteer 
from June of 1970 to July of 1972. The Northeast is a 
region that more than compensates the visitor for its 
widespread shortages of food, water, and housing with a 
rich and unique cultural heritage. Although my ex­
periences working with the SUDENE have, I hope, added 
some perspective to this thesis, I have taken pains to 
substantiate my arguments with numerous sources, and to 
avoid subjective references, for two reasons* first, I 
tend to discount the subjective character of my experiences 
in Brazil. I was not engaged in a systematic study of
vii
the SUDENE, and cannot therefore count my perceptions 
as scientifically verified. Second, the time period of 
interest with regards to the SUDENE predates my exper­
iences by ten years* The people that I might have inter­
viewed for this thesis had long since been replaced in 
the SUDENE by 1970,
I want to express my profound gratitude to Dr. Leo 
Lott, former Chairman of the Department of Political 
Science and Professor of Political Science specializing 
in Latin American Studies. As chairman of my thesis 
committee, Dr. Lott continued to offer the expert advise 
and patient consideration that has characterized his role 
in my undergraduate and graduate training,
I would also like to thank the two other members 
of my thesis committee for their help in finalizing my 
efforts* Dr. Stan Rose, professor of Foreign Languages 
and Brazilianist, whose knowledge and numerous suggestions 
led to some important areas of research* and Dr, Louis 
Hayes, professor of Political Science and Chairman of the 
Department, whose expertise in the field of political 
development added depth to my work.
CHAPTER I
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
NORTHEAST BRAZIL
Economic, Socio-political and Demographic 
Dimensions of Northeast Brazil
Economic Dimensions. Northeast Brazil is a huge region 
with an area of about 600,000 square miles and a popula­
tion of roughly 23 million.* A significant element in 
retarding the population growth has been the forced mi­
gration due to periodic drought. Although numerous re­
gional development plans have been enacted, mostly in the 
last twenty years, their effect has been minimal, as 
Shepard Foreman explained in The Brazilian Peasantry.
It is said that the drought of 1877-78 took a toll of 
over 500,000 human lives and dispatched an enormous 
labor force to the Amazon rubber trails. Nearly one 
hundred years later, the drought of 1970-71 killed un­
told numbers of people and provoked the organization 
of labor gangs for the construction of wells, dams, 
and roads, a federal strategy for drought relief that 
fails to recognize the fundamental social, economic, 
and political problems that are the basic scourge of
the landscape.2
The periodic drought, then, tends to complicate adequate 
statistical analysis of the region. Periodic onslaughts 
mean that a durable status quo, at least for a majority of
1
the population, does not exist. It is for this reason 
that Riordan Roett has noted that "economic indicators 
place the area in the same category with underdeveloped 
zones of Asia and Africa* high illiteracy, malnutrition, 
inadequate education and housing, and an antiquated agrar­
ian establishment that remains immune to change.
The per capita standard of living is an extremely 
difficult indicator to estimate in a country as large and 
economically diverse as is Brazil. In I960, the last year 
for which many of the relaible regional statistics are a- 
vailable, per capita income for all of Brazil was $280(US)j 
Brazil was ranked seventh in Latin America in per capita 
income.^ The breakdown of this figure for the Northeast 
is dramatic, however. Per capita income in the Northeast 
in I960 was $160, whereas it was $410 in the South. These 
figures do not account for periodic droughts and natural 
disasters of less frequent nature, nor do they explain the 
extreme polarization between urban and rural income levels. 
Furthermore, although rural subsistence in the Northeast 
does not necessarily require measurable income during bene­
ficial climatic periods, it becomes an absolute necessity 
in time of drought. This renders even more meaningful £ 
Stefan Robock's comment that "income is more unequally dis­
tributed in a poorer region like the Northeast than in a 
richer and more industrialized region like the South."5
Food suply is a critical measurement of the ability
3
of a region to withstand periodic catastrophy of the mag­
nitude of the seca, of drought. The World Hoodbook of Po­
litical and Social Indicators ranks Brazil as relatively 
high in national food supply* placing it at 26.5 out of 
107. Brazil is said to average 71 grams of protein and 
2950 calories per day per capita.*’ The regional break­
down, however, is again very striking. As the Area Hand­
book for Brazil, 1971 explains, "in the late 1960s the av­
erage in the Northeast was less than 1500 calories." It 
continuess
In the impoverished Northeast, a chronically depressed 
area, which has been exporting people to the cities of 
the East and the South in a steady flow since the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the average number 
of calories consumed in the late 1960s included 76 per­
cent carbohydrates(cereals, yuca, manioc, potatoes, and 
sugar), Ik percent protein(primarily meat and fish), 
and 5 percent animal and vegetable fats. Protein in­
take represented, on the average, a little more than 
half the amount considered necessary for an adequate 
diet.7
These figures indicate that subsistence farming in the 
Northeast provides, in general, little more than the bar­
est subsistence, and this factor explains the devastating 
effects of drought.
Educational Dimensions. Literacy rates in Brazil strongly 
reflect the disparity between urban and rural sectors. 
According to the UN Statistical Yearbook. 1971. the urban 
population of Brazil was about 79•9 percent literate(al­
though no precise definition of literacy is established) 
in 1970, whereas the rural population was 39.1 percent
g
literate(tooth figures for 15 years and older).
A 1968 survey of literacy among people between the 
ages of fourteen and thirty four in parts of the South, 
East, and Northeast regions indicated a wide disparity 
between urban and rural localities and between regions. 
The lowest rate was in the Northeast, where 77*7 per­
cent of the urban and 44*9 percent of the rural dwel­
lers were literate. The highest was in Sao Paulo State0 
where urban and ruralQliteracy rates were 93*5 and 82.5 
percent respectively.9
It must be added, however, that in a cultural sense large 
and statistically significant areas of the Brazilian back- 
lands have not tradtionally played a part in that nation's 
social research; if this factor is coupled with loose stan­
dards of literacy, it becomes difficult to corroborate even 
as modest a literacy average as 44,9 percent. Shepard Fore­
man noted after over a decade of research in the rural sec­
tor of the Northeast that
Illiteracy still runs well over $0 percent in Brazil 
and up to 100 percent in some rural areas. Rural Pri­
mary schools are often taught by semi-literates, who, 
with no pedagogic materials, can provide little more 
than knowledge of the alphabet through repititious cop­
ying of the ABCs and some rudimentary mathematics.
Education has traditionally been limited in Brazil. 
As a colony, Brazil— perhaps more than any other Latin Amer­
ican colony— was tied either to the educational facilities
of Portugal, or to those limitied facilities provided by 
11the Jesuits. The Jesuits adhered to a firm policy of
social preference in the provision of education, and even
"elementary schools served the aristocracy,"*-^
The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1759 destroyed the 
limited educational facilities that had existed.
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An attempt was made to institute a more nearly 
universal system, but this failed, primarily be­
cause of lack of interest and organization.* 3
After independence, a rapid growth of private secondary 
schooling occurred, most notably in the mid 1800s, and by 
the end of that century several colleges had been establish­
ed.*^ But despite periodic reforms and development efforts, 
including those of the 1930s and 1960s, Brazilian "edu­
cation retains the prestige held since colonial days when
• • 1 5it was the privilege of the small upper class.
Levels of educational adequacy are difficult to 
assess with regard to Northeast Brazil today. Brazil is 
ranked 114 out of 131 in "educational expenditures" by the 
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,*^ with a 
per capita annual expenditure of $4.63 US(as opposed to 
$188.55 in the U.S.).*^ But this does not reveal the full 
impact of the problem in the Northeast. As with other im­
portant areas of development, educational advances have 
been highly uneven, with large regional disparities.
The availability and quality of schools differed 
sharply between the urban and rural areas and among 
the geographic regions of the country. Availablitiy 
of schooling was much greater in urban than in rural 
areas, and education above the elementary level was 
found almost exclusively in cities and towns. By 
regions, the school populations at all levels in the 
South were at least twice the size of those in the 
Northeast. 1-8
Demographic Dimensions. Ramifications of the Brazilian 
population explosion in the Northeast may have especially 
damaging effects on development efforts in that region.
A net population increase of two million people per year 
19in Brazil is evident in the Northeast, although exact 
figures are not available. It is certain, however, that 
virtually any population increase in the region taxes the 
limited food supply. Nevertheless, population control is 
a highly political question in Latin America, and some au­
thors cite population growth as a necessary corelative to 
political and socio-economic development.20 Furthermore, 
high death rates and low life expectancy, particularly in 
the Northeast, create an artificial need for increased 
birth rates. Life expectancy for Brazil was 60.7 years
(from birth) in 1970, but was AO years for the largely
21rural regions of the North, Northeast, and West. These 
figures do not underscore the full impact of the urban- 
rural split with regard to mortality rates. The rural 
sector is likewise afflicted by intense periodic migration 
of an immense scope. While no figures with regard to the 
Northeast are available, it is possible to locate figures 
regarding the migrants from the Northeast.
Flight from the drought-striken localities has for 
a century been a movement out of the intermittently 
parched Northeast region....During the 1960s an esti­
mated 200,000 have left this area annually for the 
cities of the East and South and the farms of the Oen- 
tral-West and virgin parts of the Amazon basin. A 1967 
survey showed that nearly AO percent of the migrants to 
urban Brasilia and to the rural localities surrounding 
it had coma from the Northeast. Until the 1870s half 
of the country's population lived in the Northeast re­
gion, but the exodus from the region during the sub­
sequent years had resulted by 1968 in a relative re­
duction in population.to an estimated 20 percent of 
the country's total. 22
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Thus, while the Northeast population has probably made 
only slight net gains, and has declined relative to other 
regions, a high birth rate has nevertheless had a per­
nicious effect on development efforts. The basic reason 
for this is outlined by Edward Williams and Freeman Wright, 
They note with regard to development in Latin America in 
general that a pronounced birth rate in the poorest sector, 
accompanied by high mortality rates, has produced "a very 
young population whose consumption far exceeds its contri­
bution to the development process,
Contemporary Trends, Recent development efforts in the 
Northeast have met with little success? the plight of the 
nordeatinos remains essentially unchanged. Evidence of 
the great unevenness of Brazilian economic development is 
especially apparent with regards to disparity between re­
gions, a conditionsthat has only recenty been mitigated 
to a small extent.
The Northeast states and most the other poorer states 
improved their relative income shares from 1964- 
through 1967, the latest date for which national in­
come data are available. The Northeadt region did in­
crease its share of total national income, but even 
with the continued exodus of population from the' re­
gion— although at lower rates than during the 1950s—  
the average per capita income of the region rose only 
moderately.. In 1967# the average income per capita 
of that region remained about half of the national av­
erage, only a fifth of the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
Guanabara, and a quarter of the state of Sao Paulo. 4
But again, the figures mask the condition of the rural
nordestino during times of drought. Foreman emphasizes
that suffering in the Northeast "is a national dis­
grace, intricately tied to the periodic successes of the 
various export crops that have dominated all of the re­
gional and national economies of Brazil for most of its 
history and also to the more recent growth of cities and 
industry,...
Explanations of the Poverty. The simplest of searches 
through the literature and records of Northeast Brazil 
soon becomes a tour of human misery and suffering. The 
problems of the region are intense, the landscape severe, 
and the achievements of human struggle are often rendered 
meaningless. Drought, poverty, and forced migration are 
conditions that reinforce each other and tend to form a 
self-perpetuating cycle, one that appears at a cursory 
glance to be unbreakable.
If severity is an important component of beauty, 
then it is not surprising why so much of the literature 
that has emerged from the Northeast has unique and aes­
thetically engrossing qualities. Nordestinos like Gra- 
ciliano Ramos, Jose Lins do Rego, and Jorge Amado have 
produced some of Brazil's finest fiction, and have been 
widely translated. One of the greatest accounts of the 
Northeast is not fictional, however. Euclides da Cunha, 
in his epic Os Sertoes, was able to convey the severity 
of the Northeast, and of the seca, or periodic drought.
It was early summer, and the backlands were begin­
ning to take on the melancholy aspect of a desert.
The sun-soaked trees were withering and were shed­
ding their leaves and flowers from day to days and 
covering the ground was the dark-grey stubble of the 
parched weeds, revealing the latent presence of the 
drought with its unseen conflagration. The crude 
bright light of the warm day was dazzling and implac­
able against a sky that showed no appreciable change 
from dawn to dusk. Day would break in a golden morn­
ing and, after having scorched the earth for hours, 
would at once be extinguished in night.
The Northeast can be divided geographically into 
three zones* the litoral, or tropical coastal zone, where 
high rainfall produces a tropical rain forest climate suit­
able for the production of sugar; the zona agreste, or for­
ested zone, which borders on the litoral, is slightly high­
er in elevation and less humid, and likewise figures in the 
production of sugar as well as fruits and vegetables in 
subsistence farming conditions; and the sertao. or inland 
plateau, a huge polygonal area with savannah climate with 
regular drought cycles where cattle production, when it is 
possible, is the primary mode of subsistence. When it is 
not possible, when the summer thundershowers do not arrive 
and the landscape is transformed into desert, then the ser- 
tane.jos become flagelados, beaten ones, tormented by their 
land and driven from it. These disastrous droughts have 
been recorded at regular intervals since the beginning of 
Portuguese settlement in the sertffo. as Charles Wagley 
noted in An Introduction to Brazil.
Droughts are recorded as far back as 1710-1711, and 
every eight to fifteen years thereafter until the
10
present. During the drought of 1877-1879, the entire 
sertao was burned black by the sun, the cattle died, 
and there were no crops. On writer estimated that al­
most 500,000 people had died from starvation or from 
diseases connected with starvation during this single 
drought period.2?
The seca comprises only one dimension of the prob­
lem of human poverty and privation, however. The following 
pages of this chapter will explore the human, geographic, 
political, and environmental dimensions of this unfortunate 
region of Brazil, as seen through the eyes of some of its 
most celebrated writers and foreign observers.
Tendencies Toward Single-Cause Explanation. The search for 
a central factor responsible for the peverty and privation 
in Northeast Brazil is an enterprise that is, in many sen­
ses, predisposed to failure; this becomes evident in a brief 
glance at the literature of the region. A wide spectrum 
of excuses for the disparity between the regions of the 
Northeast and the South has been proffered; a vague sort of 
agreement is possible only in the notion that the entire 
Northeast is certainly beset with a potpourri of chronic 
and acute disaster.
It is difficult even in a paper as cursory and periph­
eral as is this one to refrain from elaborating on the vast 
consequences of the seca. Drought is an occurrence that 
lends itself well to the imagry of single-cause explanation. 
Euclides da Cunha is perhaps most responsible for the my­
opia which surrounds and pervades the regional problems.
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As a journalist who accompanied the Brazilian mil­
itary response to an uprising by fanatic sertane.ios in 1897f 
da Cunha was able to observe and describe a region that had 
gone unrecorded in Brazilian literature. Rather than lim­
iting his scientific and lyrical description to the im­
mediate area of conflict, da Cunha devoted considerable en­
ergy and care in presenting a background of the entire 
Northeast region, producing at one juncture what has been 
described as "the sixty-one finest pages ever written in 
the Qportuguesel language,"^® Da Cunha's primary focus 
was on the struggle for survival in the sertao during the 
drought, and this has probably contributed to a great de­
gree in establishing the stereotype of the region* that 
the immense poverty and privation of the region are neces­
sarily and inextricably linked to natural disaster.
As a positivist scholar, da Cunha tended to empha­
size "natural" causal relationships, and to minimize or ig­
nore social inequities. He regarded the racially-mixed 
sertanejo from an ambivolent standpoint. He described the 
resident of the sertao as both mentally inferior and par­
ticularly well adapted to the suffering of a harsh climate. 
But there was more to da Cunha*s view. When Brazilian t 
troops attacked(and were initially repulsed by) the follow­
ers of the religious fanatic Antonio Conselheiro, da Cunha 
wrote that "it was the very core of our nationality, the 
bedrock of our race, which troops were attacking here...."
12
A subsequent qualification of this remark argued that his 
comments had been critical of that "bedrock", but the 
impression remains that da Cunha ultimately admired and 
identified with the people from the sertao.
The Natural Disaster Explanation. The quality of life for 
■the sertane.jo, as da Cunha repeatedly explains, is en­
tirely dependent upon the arrival of the rains. If by . 
March there is no trace of the trovoada, or thundershower, 
then a general anxiety begins to afflict the backcountry. 
Pood supplies, already low, are more strenuously rationed, 
and fears of the worst predominate. In that da Cunha em- 
hasized the natural dimension of human suffering in the 
Northeast in his classic work, he has become closely 
identified with the self interests in the region. These 
interests have traditionally found it expedient to explain 
the preponderance of poverty and human privation as inev­
itable products of the climate. Although da Cunha had no 
such regional interests, and in fact never intended his 
work to be viewed as a treatise on poverty and privation, 
its eloquence and meticulous attention make it an ex­
cellent introduction to the literature surrounding this 
explanation.
The "natural" explanation of conditions in the 
Northeast has always appealed to Brazilian governments 
in that it tends, at the very worst, to support its in­
13
clination to dismiss the problem of responsibility, and 
at best, to underscore the great number of important and 
promising public works in effect or in the offing. The 
1937 publication by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs entitled Brazil? Statistics, Resources and 
Possibilities, for example, emphasized the persistence 
of natural disasters in the region. Its section entitl­
ed "North Eastern Brazil" began?
The north east of Brazil comprises the vast region of 
the States of Piauhy, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Par- 
ahyba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia. A 
series of phenomena of various kinds, act in a decis­
ive manner upon the economy of this part of Brazil, 
resulting in periods of great abundance interspersed 
with complete stoppage of production, causing veritable 
calamities. The chif cause of this serious detriment 
to local economy is attributed to bad rain distribu­
tion and to the impermeability of the ground, which 
does not possess the necessary properties for the ab- ; 
sorbtion of pluviometrical precipitation. The Bra­
zilian Government has never neglected a national 
problem of such great importance, maintaining a de­
partment designed exclusively for the study and car­
rying out of this type of work— the "Federal Inspec­
tion Department of Works Against the Drought".3°
The chapter subsequently listed all of the plafcs and pri­
orities of the department in glowing terms, and included 
a list of about fifty recent accomplishments— dams, wells 
and irrigation systems. Nevertheless, Vera Kelsey, in her 
book Seven Keys to Brazil, observed that just two years 
later, in 1939, 90,000 refugees of the seca made the
long trek to Sao Paulo, and many more flooded into the
31capital cities of the Northeast.
Da Cunha's veracity is by no means compromised by
14
his almost impulsive fascination with the seca. From the 
context of the observer, especially one who views the im­
mediacy of this phenomenon, the socio-political bases of 
the resultant human suffering are perhaps less evident—  
and are certainly less conducive to poetry— than is this 
harsh blast of prolonged summer. Furthermore, it was the 
appeal of the poetry which first called to the popular 
attention the serious conditions in the Northeast.
Anyone who, in the heat of the summer, ventures to 
cross the northern backlands, becomes accustomed to 
unusual scenes. Particularly as the cycle of the 
drought comes on, with its alternation of burning- 
hot days and all but frigid nights, the earth appears 
to strip itself of all humanity, with all life latent, 
merely immobilizing without decomposing the beings 
that live upon it. It thereby realizes to a high de­
gree the physiological possibility of a virtual ex­
istence where no life seems to be, with all energies 
pent up, lulled to sleep simply, and ready to break 
out again of a sudden when favorable conditions re­
turn, giving rise to unforseen and amazing resurrec­tions.^
It may well be that it is the intensity of the seca which 
alters the focus of observers. Even Josue de Castro, 
whose work Death in the Northeast concentrates on the 
political and socio-economic inequities of the region, 
can be said to be swept away in a prosaic and lyrical 
vein when he describes the drought in similes and person­
ifications .
...no land gives a stronger impression of suffering 
than the sertao, with its skin baked and corroded by 
the rigors of the climate. The sandstone cover is so 
heavily eroded and denuded that in places crystalline 
rock shows through the granitic surface, and the soil 
is a thin and meager layer, with outcroppings of jag­
15
ged rock protruding like bare bones. There is a 
deep poignancy, an air of desolute suffering, in this 
wounded land, its sides riven by f l a s h  f l o o d s . 33
William L. Schurz, in his work Brazil, the Infi­
nite Country, has provided a description of the region 
which is perhaps typical of most accounts. After noting 
that it is "cursed by droughts,” and that these secas 
bring with them times "of tragedy that may be prolonged 
for a year or more,"3^ he briefly observes that chronic 
human conditions lend themselves to the suffering that 
accompanies the droughts. Gross underproductivity of 
vital food supplies within the region is underscored 
during droughts such as the very serious one of 1958*
It has been calculated that the beef supply available 
to the population declined by 300,000 metric tons, 
and the stock of basic foodstuff by a total of 700,000 
tons. The yield of corn and beans fell to fifteen per 
cent of normal, and the yield of manioc and bananas, 
the other staples in the subsistence diet of the 
sertao, was cut by half.35
Schurz's recognition of the social character of the prob­
lem of human suffering in the Northeast is typically sim­
plistic— he confuses the "inconquerable natural disaster" 
thesis with the persistence of social patterns that dic­
tate that suffering of vast magnitude will continue to 
occur. Schurz myopically reports that the social charac­
ter of the problem consists of "the singular and persis­
tent attachment of the sertane.jo to his inhospitable 
h o m e . "35 Thus, what might be considered from another per­
spective as the primary hope that the problems will one
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day be resolved, is in this typical representation dis­
missed as a source of the problems.
The seca of Northeast Brazil, then, has become an 
almost exclusive explanation of the political and socio­
economic problems of the region. This was especially 
true in da Cunha's age, when the best of military prep­
arations seemed grossly insufficient for coping with the 
drought, and a well equipped expeditionary force faced
37an almost impossible task in crossing the sertlTo in summer. 
Despite his careful attention to detail, da Cunha propa­
gated a serious misconception concerning Northeast Brazil* 
not every nordestino lives in the sertao, and even in that 
zone, much of the hunger is both chronic and perpetual.
Critics of the Natural Disaster Explanation. In his book
Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, economist Celso Furtado
describes the major proponents of the "natural disaster"
theory of human suffering in the Northeast, and explains
the generally fallacious and self-interested bases of
their arguments.
As numerous sections of the Northeastern ruling clas­
ses for a long time lived on federal government funds 
administered in an equivocal manner, a peculiar sit­
uation was created in which those groups interested 
in maintaining the status quo are the same ones who 
most dramatize the region's problems and cry out for 
the need for change. However, we are dealing with a 
dramatization based on false problems that deflects 
attention from the real ones. For this reason, the 
"droughts" have been made into the great enemy to be 
contended with, responsible for all the ills that
38
torment the Northeasterner.
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Furtado analyzes the extent to which the "drought explan­
ation" has harmed efforts to alleviate suffering in the 
Northeast.
The irresponsibility of those who exploited the 
drought harmed the Northeast in two wayst on the 
one hand it created a false image of the problems 
of that region, whose real possibilities for de­
velopment began to be underestimated, with talk of 
the inevitability of its progressive abandonmenti 
on the other, it justified in the minds of the ma­
jority of the country’s rulers their neglect of the 
problems of the Northeast, a region to which "there 
was no point in sending money," since the money would 
in any case always be misused. To put right the false 
image, and to give an accurate picture of the complex 
reality of the region, is the first requirement for 
an understanding of the problem of the Northeast.
Since this book was published, identification and recog­
nition of the complexity of the problems of the North­
east have been undertaken from a variety of perspectives.
Miguel Arraes, former governor of the state of 
Pernambuco and radical critic of the present regime in 
Brazil, is firm in his political analysis of the basic 
problem.
[The present Brazilian governmentJ is quite unable 
to do anything at all to alter the present system of 
land ownership and to improve the lot of the mass of 
poor peasants and agricultural wage-earners.^®
Arraes argues that the penetration of foreign capital into
all levels of Brazilian industry has created a one-sided
trade relationship in which Brazil receives far less than
it contributes. Furthermore, the nature of this situation
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is such that the government becomes progressively depen­
dent upon it. His observation is corroborated by numer­
ous other analysts of Brazilian political and socio-econ­
omic development.
Josue^de Castro expresses a viewpoint which is 
equidistant between blaming and disclaiming the seca as 
the major problem of the Northeast. Although much of his 
book Death in the Northeast concerns the political dimen­
sions of hunger in that region, de Castro is a native 
Nordestino, and has a great awe and respect for the im­
mense physical and psychological impact of drought. But 
his primary point is that drought must be put in a per*-:, 
spective that is relative to social and political fac­
tors.
The drought is a secondary, a subsidiary cause, which 
merely aggravates an existing state of affairs deter­
mined by.other causes, that are social rather than 
natural./*1
The s£ca, for all its intensity, is no enemy of the 
caatinga, or the sparse, thorny vegetation of the sertao. 
As Celso Furtado noted, "the Caatinga is designed to re­
sist drought, even if it lasts as long as two or three
I t  Oyears, which sometimes happens.** The seca can be seen 
from this context not as a natural disaster, but rather 
as a natural and recurrent phenomenon. The social re­
action to this phenomenon, starvation and forced migra­
tion, have little meaning without the prolonged social
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acceptance of these conditions.
A long-term economic relationship has been observ­
ed between the populations of the different climaetic 
zones of the Northeast which is based in large measure on 
the continued dependency of the people of the sertaoj this 
is perhaps a crucial first step evaluating the social and 
political dimensions of poverty in the region. The fact 
that areas of high labor-intensive industry are periodi­
cally glutted with desparate and capable workers— as the 
sertanejos have established themselves— is of critical 
importance. One historian who hints at this thesis is 
Charles Wagley. In An Introduction to Brazil. Wagley i f * 
notes the complementary dependency between labor from 
"tlle sertao and producers of sugar and cacao in its border 
regi ons.
Every year considerable numbers of sertane.jos, as the 
inhabitants of the interior are called, leave their 
homes and participate in the sugarcane and cacao har­
vests of the coastal region. The economic viability 
of these crops has become completely dependent on this 
influx of sertane.jo labor for short periods during the 
year. ^
The tendency of economic dependency to perpetuate itself 
creates conditions that persist long after the rains have 
returned.
Sugar and Cattle. A recent article in a small English- 
language newspaper that specializes in Latin America noted 
that "Brazil may now be the World’s top sugar producer.
Its harvest is expected to be almost 7 million metric 
tons this year...."^ The recent growth of the Brazilian 
sugar industry underscores the cyclical patterns of "boom 
and bust" which has plagued the Brazilian economy since 
the seventeenth century. Sugar production in Northeast 
Brazil was responsible for such a pattern of rapid growth 
followed by massive collapsej furthermore, many observers 
have noted that it was the cultivation of sugar cane in 
the Northeast which was responsible for propagating re­
gressive and anti-democratic social strata.
Furtado observed that the establishment of a 
sugar industry in the litoral, and of cattle production 
in the sertao, in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies gave rise to many of the problems of the twen­
tieth century.
The characteristics acquired by the two economic sys­
tems in the Northeast— the sugar industry and stock 
breeding— during the slow process of decline, begin­
ning in the latter half of the seventeenth century, 
were basic factors in the formation of what was to 
become.the Brazilian economy of the twentieth cen­
tury.
The technical description that follows in Furtado*s analy­
sis emphasizes a pathology of development in Northeast 
Brazil that has persisted since colonial days. Its 
primary characteristic is a complete lack of socio-econ­
omic planning. In this environment, the sugar and cattle 
industries spread beyond their viable limits, encompassing 
and often suffocating vital and irreplacable segments of
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the economy*
While Furtado emphasized the economic liabilities 
of the sugar and cattle industries in Northeast Brazil, 
Gilberto Freyre, a well-known Brazilian sociologist, has 
stressed the social problems that resulted from their ex­
clusive development. In a key paragraph of his book 
Casa Grande e Senzala, he observed that
Sugar raising not only stifled the democratic indus­
tries represented by the trade in brazilwood and 
hides,* it sterilized the land for the forces; of di­
versified farming and herding for a broad expanse 
around the plantations. It called for an enormous 
number of slaves. Cattle-raising, meanwhile, with 
the possibilities it afforded for a democratic way of 
life, was relegated to the backlands. ^7
The backlands, it would be discovered, could not adequate­
ly support the cattle industry, although a negative con­
dition of dependence uppn it soon developed. Conditions 
were established which led to the entrenchment of sterile 
and non-viable monocultures.
Caio Prado, in The Colonial Background of Modern 
Brazil, further underscores the poverty of the cattle in­
dustry in the sertao. Much like the sugar industry, its 
environment seemed to dictate the outcome.
The Sertao offered only miserable subsistence for cat­
tle, hardly enough to survive * and it was, impossible 
to avoid producing the scrawny and muscular bullocks 
that furnished the unappetizing meat eaten in the 
colony.^8
Social Consequences. The thesis in Prado's work, much
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like that found in Freyre*s, is that the colonization
process provided for future development, and established
firm patterns, in the Northeast. Prado described these
patterns as "'forces' whose most external significant
manifestation was the anxiety...permeating all classes
49and groups of society...." Prado continued*
Another essential outcome of the colonization process... 
must be singled out. This was the growing number of 
people condemned to a marginal existence outside the 
normal productive activity of colonization. This ac­
tivity was almost exclusively limited ro members of 
the closed circle of the colony's basic economic and 
social organization* masters and slaves, the entre­
preneurs and administrators of colonization and their 
humble tools. As long as there were only masters and 
slaves, as at the very beginning, everything went well. 50
Abolition of slavery in 1889 accelerated the creation of 
a large marginal class, according to Gaio Prado, which 
persists into the present.
Freyre indicts the colonial process for establish­
ing social patterns which contribute to the poverty of 
the modern Northeast. Furthermore, he observes that the 
conditions of human poverty tend to some extent to be s^lf- 
perpetuating. Poor-nutrition is an important example of 
a condition which, according to Freyre, provides for a 
social structure based upon consequent physiological weak­
nesses, After suggesting that nutritional deficiencies 
can be responsible for debilitation of mental capacities, 
he notes that*
Prominent among the effects of hyponutrition are*
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a decrease in stature, weight, and chest measurement; 
deformities of the bony structure; decalcification of 
the teeth; thyroid insufficiency, pituitary and gonad- 
inal, leading to premature old age, a generally impov­
erished fertility, apathy....5*
Freyre emphasizes a sort of fatalistic determinism based
upon these colonial patterns— he denies in many respects
the capacity of the people and society of the Northeast
to change. To this extent, his account of the nordestino
is closely related to the "natural" explanation of poverty
and privation in that region.
In the final analysis, the problems of poverty
and privation in Northeast Brazil must be reduced to ,
basic constituents, including widespread lack of food,
shelter, and medical services. De Castro concludes*
What causes so much dying in the Northeast? People 
die of everything, of course, but mainly they die of 
hunger-— hunger in multiple disguises is the most ac­
tive of the four horsemen. Hunger kills as a disease— 
the most serious and generalized of the mass diseases 
of the underdeveloped regions— and also by making way 
for other sicknesses.
Political Ramifications
Fear Tactics and Results. A complex body of writings has 
emerged since 1962 that deals with the socio-economic pre­
requisites of change in Northeast Brazil. While some of 
the writers in this field have proposed solutions that 
appear to be grounded in "objective" principles of social
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science* others have engaged in exercises that are closer 
akin to blatent political opportunism. The ramifications 
of "scare tactics" in the Northeast are extensive. Indeed^ 
such tactics may have constituted the primary motivation 
for a number of programs, including the Alliance for Pro­
gress, a U.S. sponsored aid program that became noteworthy 
during its ten years of existence for its lack of both 
alliance and progress.
World-wide attention was drawn to the Northeast 
in I960 primarily because of newspaper coverage of the 
traditional problems of drought and consequent political 
unrest in that region. Two articles appeared in the New 
York Times, for example, which emphasized a correlation 
between the Northeast and Cuba, a recent debacle from the 
standpoint of many U.S. policy-makers. Tad Sculc noted 
in one of these articles, published on October 31* i960, 
that an environment conducive to revolution existed in 
Northeast Brazil, and that this condition was becoming
53manifested in "peasant leagues?,’ a nomenclature that
suggested the Chinese agrarian revolution. In a second
article, Szulc helpfully added that'”’Recife is the support
base for the southern string of tracking stations of the
South Atlantic guided missile range of the United States 
54Air Force." His point was emphasized by the title of the 
article, "Marxists Organizing Peasants in Brazil." The 
attention of President-elect Kennedy was drawn by this
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focus, and the Alliance for Progress, a product of the 
new Kennedy administration, was designed in part to 
respond to the conditions in the largest concentrated 
poverty area of the western hemisphere, the Brazilian 
Northeast,
Of key importance in the subsequent history of 
the Northeast was the simultaneous formation by the 
Brazilian government of a new economic planning agency 
under the guidance and leadership of Furtado. The 
Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste, or 
SUDENE, was initially charged with coordinating a re­
novation of:political, economic and social institutions 
in the Northeast which actively contributed to the 
status quo, a task of overwhelming proportions.
Riordan Roett has described the relationship that devel­
oped between the Alliance and the SUDENE in The Politics 
of Foreign Aid. He noted that hostility and fear on the 
part of U.S. functionaries in the Alliance program were 
important factors in the eventual breakdown of the rela­
tionship. Of likewise importance was the scope of the 
task that both agencies confronted.
The problems that hampered the Alliance and the SUDENE 
came in large measure from the inability of the politi­
cal institutions of Brazil to cope with an accelera­
tion in the rate of social and economic change.55
The Alliance was confronted with ambiguous goals of poli­
tical and military security on the one hand, and radical
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economic and social change on the other. It should not 
be surprising, in view of this ambiguity, that the Alli­
ance for Progress left the Northeast in 1971 in essential­
ly the same condition in which it had found it.
Although aware of the modernization potential of for­
eign aid, the Kennedy administration and its successor 
failed to use assistance funds to support those groups 
committed to realistic societal changei indirectly, 
the emergency aid policies of the United States worked 
to prolong the influence of the traditional social and 
economic groups. The United States in the 1960s found 
itself in the awkward position of advocating political 
and social modernization in underdeveloped nations 
while possessing and using foreign aid as an instru­
ment to impede modernization in the name of national and international security.56
According Roett, the administrators of the U.S, program 
were incapable of recognizing the primary constituents of 
the problem of poverty in the Northeast. Furthermore,
U.S. officials came to disapprove of the structure of the 
SUDENE, and opted to support only one of its goals— that 
of regional industrialization. The long-range result of 
this policy has been the importation into the Northeast 
of highly subsidized, and often fully automated, factor­
ies that tend to mass produce articles from southern 
Brazilian resources, and then transport those articles 
back to the South. Miguel Arraes, in his book Brazil>
The Power and the People, presented one interpretation of 
the U.S. policy of stimulating industrialization.
The policy of industrialization at any price and 
through free enterprise amounts actually to a de­
fense of free penetration by foreign companies.
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But in the final analysis, American advisors based their 
decisions on feari fear that the Northeast would become 
"another Cuba". Furthermore, they.sensed a close con­
nection between economic conditions and political sta­
bility that may well have less significance in the 
Brazilian setting. As Peter Ranis observed,
Brazilians have long taken sustenance from a non- 
ideological view of political life which has per­
mitted them to "muddle through" difficulties by 
compromise solutions. They have elevated prag­
matism to a social art, and this has often saved 
the Brazilian nation from bloody revolutions^  
political violence, and military fratricide.**3
To American and European journalists, the emergence of
familiar political patterns overshadowed the lessons of
the Brazilian past, and may well have contributed to an
erroneous assessment of the situation in the Northeast.
Conclusion. The literature of the Northeast indicates 
that regional problems are not simple, and that political 
change in that region, barring unforseen and drastic de­
velopments, is relatively unlikely. The Northeast is of­
ten romanticized, but rarely is it viewed as a land of 
plenty. It is a center of human suffering, and this, 
perhaps more than any other, is the theme of the liter­
ature of the Northeast.
Solutions to the regional problems will depend 
upon the recognition and dynamic treatment of a variety 
of obstacles. Many critics agree that one of these is
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a general Brazilian reluctance to accept political 
change. The inability of Brazil, whose southern states 
are wealthy in the context of Latin America, to recognize 
the plight of the Northeast as a national problem is 
crucial in this regard. The national tendency to re­
gard the Northeast as a wasteland, to recognize only 
the stereotype of the sertao. is likewise regressive.
De Castro emphasizes that drought is not the focal 
point of poverty in this region.
...in reality not all of the Northeast is dry, and 
drought is by no means the basic cause of all calam­
ity, even in the deep sertffo.59
De Castro is not denying the existence and recurrence of 
severe drought— he is merely contradicting those who main­
tain that physical solutions such as dams, irrigation 
projects and wells will solve the problems of poverty 
in the region. The starting point in overcoming these 
problems, he contends, is located within those political 
and economic institutions which actively resist change.
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CHAPTER I I
NATIONALISM, POLITICAL AGITATION, AND 
THE GENESIS OF THE SUDENE
An Institutional Response. It cannot be denied that North­
east Brazil has problems of the scope and intensity to 
challenge even the most comprehensive program of economic 
development. Roett has written thati
The Northeast is an area of extreme underdevelopment. 
Economic and social indicators place the area in the 
same category with underdeveloped zones of Asia and 
Africas high illiteracy, malnutrition, inadequate ed­
ucation and housing, and an antiquated agrarian es­
tablishment that remains immune to change.
The task of this paper is to outline the political bases 
of this "underdevelopment" and to take issue with the age- 
old argument that the drought of the Northeast is an in- 
conquerable force that mandates the regional condition of 
poverty. One of de Castro's primary points in Death in 
the Northeast is that traditional landed interests of the 
region actively and consistently resist political and econ­
omic change, and are, in this sense, directly responsible
Jfor the patterns that have persisted.
Brazilian institutions experienced a rapid growth 
period between 1952 and 196A, and it was during this time
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that the Brazilian government created another agency in 
the Northeast to deal with the problems of poverty and 
privation in that region. It was called the Superinten- 
dencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste(the Northeast De­
velopment Superintendency)» or the SUDENE. Celso 
Furtado, a widely-known Brazilian economist, was appointed 
its first director. Roett described the SUDENE plan 
which had come into being by I960.
The SUDENE was a federal agency and, as such, it had
a potential capacity to rival the political oligarchy 
of the area through the creation of a new, reformist 
coalition and by possessing a comprehensive develop­
ment program that was not dependent on the region for 
financial support.3
Although extreme conditions of poverty existed in the 
Brazilian rural sector in general, the government chose 
to concentrate on the most egregious example, and to opt
for a regional "experimental" plan. By appointing a
Northeastern economist to head the agency, it was as­
sumed that regional sentiments would lend themselves to 
the tasks ahead. Such a regionalist sentiment, in fact, 
was probably essential for even a modicum of success, 
given the broad and ill-defined goals of the institution.
The validity of the regional approach became the 
crucial question. By late 1963« Furtado was simultaneous­
ly the superintendent of the SUDENE and the chief archi­
tect responsible for writing a five-year economic devel­
opment plan for the nation. While he spoke in favor of
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a national plan of development, Furtado's primary con­
cern was with regional programs. He wrote about this 
critical period prior to 1964 in a book published in 
1965 in which he mentioned that although an independent 
national electorate was becoming more and more evident, 
the legislature nevertheless retained its traditional 
structuret a composite of conservative and regional 
interests that constantly engaged in impasse with the 
executive branch,^ Regional solutions, though gener­
ally inadequate in the long-run, were the only politically 
feasible solutions in that political milieu.
The emphasis of the SUDENE upon development in 
the rural sector, furthermore, was probably its strongest 
point, Guy Hunter noted in Modernizing Peasant Societies 
that "the strategy of rural development is...a part of 
the total strategy by which the political aims of a so­
ciety are to be achieved...."^ A*a populous region com­
prised primarily of what might be called a "peasant" pop­
ulation, the Northeast held the key to development in 
the nation— especially its rural sector. By the same 
token, the fact that the SUDENE failed first, and most 
dramatically in the rural Northeast meant that it 
could not provide for the conditions that appear to have 
been essential for significant political and economic 
change in the Northeast,
By i960, Furtado and his staff of young bureau-
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crats realized that the processes of political and socio­
economic development in the region would require large 
pools of resources and exceptional, at least in the con­
text of Brazilian politics, political considerations.
This was especially true with regards to the political 
dimensions of "modernization", and the problem of author­
ity. David Apter, in discussing the generalities of 
the "modernization" process, notes thati
Modernization may be described in non-industrial so­
cieties as the transposition of certain roles— profes­
sional, technical, administrative— and the transposi­
tion of institutions supporting these roles— hospitals, 
schools, universities, bureaucracies. Non-industrial 
modernizing societies, however, lack the powerful inte­
grating thrust found in industrial societies. Social 
organizations are more chaotic and confused. Politics 
becomes the mechanism of integration, and authority is 
the critical problem confronting the leader.
Furtado immediately confronted this authority crisis in
Northeast Brazil by establishing a political base of
authority. Such support was necessary in order to
accomplish even minimal goals. Stefan Robock, of the
Brookings Institution, identified Furtado's political
support in a report on Northeast Brazil published in
1963.
Although President Janio Quadros gave Celso 
Furtado cabinet member status, neither Quadros 
nor his successor, Joao Goulart, exerted strong 
political leadership to have Congress approve the 
Northeast plan. To win the political battle, Fur­
tado and his dedicated associates developed five 
main sources of political strengthj the state 
governors in the Northeast, federal legislators 
from the South, university student groups, Bra­
zilian nationalists, and the United States for­
eign aid program.?
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The authority crisis that later beset the SUDENE can be 
traced to the erosion of these bases of support. Further­
more, as these bases began to erode, Furtado was forced 
to devote more of his time to political, rather than tech­
nical, activities. His priorities therefore suffered a 
simultaneous and related erosion.
A strong indication of the degree to which Fur­
tado was victimized by politics— in the banal sense of 
the word— is suggested by the aftermath of the Brazilian 
military coup of 1964, Widely known as a technician and 
a scholar, Furtado was allowed to leave Brazil without 
detainment during April of 1964. Before the end of the 
year, however, conservative interests had convinced the 
military to issue a warrant for his arrest as a sub­
versive. Although Furtado considers himself to be a 
leftist, his plans for the Northeast emphasized indus- ' 
trialization based on private investment. Furthermore, 
he consistently alienated communists and socialists 
with such programs as tax breaks for corporations willing 
to expand into the Northeast, and at one juncture earned 
their armed animosity.
In late February, 1964, a labor organization dominated 
by the communists transported armed peasants by truck 
to Recife and had them surround the SUDENE building in 
a bid to prevent a meeting which was going to discuss 
whether to allow foreign companies to take advantage 
of the tax incentives. The peasants carried signs de­
nouncing "imperialism" and defending "basic reforms." 
According to one of the local newspapers, the police _ 
stayed away and let the demonstration run its course.
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In retrospect, efforts by the SUDENE to effect 
political change in Northeast Brazil alienated virtually 
all of the traditional and popular political interests.
The exigencies of political development meant that a 
wide spectrum of solutions had to be experimented with, 
and although many of these were soon rejected, the pub­
licity that resulted remained behind as a pernicious 
force. As Robock noted in 1963. "the SUDENE movement was 
destined to evoke the maximum of political resistance.
Of central importance in the wide spectrum of 
resistence experienced by the SUDENE after 1961 was the 
presence of growing nationalism in Brazil. Furthermore, 
the military coup of 1964, and the dozen years of military 
dictatorship that have followed it, have not significantly 
altered many of the basic patterns that are associated 
with the growth of national industrial potential in 
developing nations. Thus, in some key respects, events 
since 1964 have accentuated political change in the North­
east, although it has been a change that is without plan 
or order. Ironically, it has been the traditional landed 
interests that have suffered the most significant loss 
of influence.
The extension of government controls over municipal 
offices and expenditures after 1964 has substantially 
reduced the store of patronage that for the better 
part of this century allowed rural elites to compete 
for a following, thereby impairing the patron’s abil­
ity to meet his former dependents' new demands. At 
the same time, newspapers, radio broadcasts, in some
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cases television, and the actual presence of urban 
organizers bring alternative messages into the coun­
tryside, thus broadening the peasants' horizons and 
further circumscribing the patron's sphere of influ­
ence.
The movement of nationalism into the Northeast was perhaps 
the critical condition with regards to the success of the 
SUDENE, and those development efforts that have followed 
it. The insensitivity of the directors of the SUDENE to 
this factor was of great importance to the efficacy of 
the programs. In a sense, the widespread resistance to 
the SUDENE represented two extremes in coalition* the 
nationalist sentiment, rejecting one more regional solu­
tion for the Northeast; and the regional oligarchical in­
terests, attacking another national encroachment on their 
influence.
Regionalism in a Nationalist Period. Northeast regional 
development plans, in general, have quickly regressed in­
to colossal tragicomedies, especially in view of the grav­
ity of the problems that they have sought to overcome. 
Their consistent inability to mitigate the persistent con­
ditions of poverty and privation in the region suggests 
some obvious shortcoming. Their approaches have followed 
a variety of forms, but perhaps the one common thread 
among them is their regional focus. It should be noted 
at this juncture that conditions of human poverty and 
privation exist throughout the rural sector of Brazil.
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The national dimensions of the problem suggests the 
inherent weaknesses that are invariably part of region­
al programs like the SUDENE. If only the problem of 
periodic mass migration is considered* it is apparent that 
conditions in one geographical area of the rural sector 
are incapable of significant development relative to other 
rural areas.
A primary consideration of the politics of Brazil 
is the extent to which they are, in fact, closely tied to 
federalism. An example of this is the DNOCS, or the 
National Department of Works Against the Drought, which 
has sought for many years to overcome the physical prop­
erties of drought through dams, wells, irrigation projects, 
and crop rotation in the Northeast. Established in the 
1890's, it has remained virtually oblivious to the human 
problems of the Northeast while concentrating on a limited 
and mutually beneficial relationship with the region's 
elite. At the same time, on a federal level, it has 
effectively placated or rebutted many of the complaints 
lodged in the federal congress concerning living conditions 
in the rural sector.
Regional concessions to parochial power structures 
have long been the norm of Brazilian politics, and the 
result has been the growth of powerful regional oli­
garchies. This pattern, which was initiated as early as 
the colonial period, was fostered during the empire, and
kl
emerged repeatedly since then in periodic spurts. The
first of these occurred shortly after the formation of
the First Republic in 1889.
The politics of the First Republic were characterized 
by a limited franchise, the economic dominance of the 
states of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, tacit support of 
the armed forces, and a process of 'adjustment and com­
promise among the oligarchies, a politica dos govern- 
adores(the politics of the governors), an understand­
ing that the central government would not interfere 
in the internal affairs of the states.**
In terms of the Northeast, this meant that the entrenched 
conservative landowning class received renewed national 
support. Subsequent periods of stimulus to local oligar­
chies preserved this class in power through the 1930s, 
when:
urban centers remained largely extensions of an agrar­
ian society. Newspapers reflected elite opinion. The 
church co-operated with the oligarchy in guaranteeing 
redemption only to those who realized that their role,. ? 
in the political system was that of a non-participant.
Although examples exist of social unrest based on the con­
ditions of the Northeast in the 1930s, most notably that 
of the bandit Lampiao, a significant political ’awakening* 
cannot be said to have occurred in the countryside.
The decade of the 19^0s, however, signaled the 
arrival of a new set of circumstances. Brazil, for a 
variety of reasons, had entered into a new nationalist 
phase which began to spread rapidly into the countryside. 
Foreman explains:
Population shifts brought great pressures to bear not
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only in urban areas but also in the countryside. 
Increased demands for agricultural produce and a 
rationalization of the internal marketing system 
contributed to a sudden valorization of agricul­
tural land and the subsequent displacement of 
masses of peasants. Rural-urban migration and 
the remittance of new ideas contributed to the 
making of a peasant consciousness or, at the very 
least, to a recognition that their defined set of 
needs could not be best expressed through "tradi­
tional" channels.*3
The formation of a national peasant identity in the 1940s 
and 1950s could be said to have followed general patterns 
associated with growing nationalism. Less related factors 
that nevertheless contributed significantly to a new na­
tional identity during this period included a world champ­
ionship soccer team(1958) and the rapid proliferation of 
battery-powered radios throughout the countryside. But 
one of the basic factors, the industrialization of the 
South, insured that rapid communication technology would 
find its way into even the most remote corner of the 
sertao. Furthermore, it created a lucrative and stable 
job market in the South, one that would begin to attract 
increasing numbers of nordestinos. Furthermore, new 
demand for agricultural products created intense strains 
on the archaic methods of agriculture, and linked the 
producers increasingly with the modern techniques and e 
implements of the South. Thus the new awareness and 
subsequent pressures brought on by industrialization in 
the South began to nationalize the rural sector, and 
while many of the trappings of regional politics persisted,
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problems that could be more closely associated with 
nationalism began to emerge more and more frequently.
National identity, and the problems of nation- 
building, comprise an important dimension in understand­
ing why it was that the SUDENE was unable to bring about 
significant political and economic development. Williams 
and Wright note that the development of a variety of con­
ditions took place all over Latin America during this 
period. They included such elements as increased politi­
cal power, the increased ability to carry out massive agrar­
ian reforms, and the extensive growth of bureaucracies.
They describe tendencies toward nation-building in Latin 
America after 1946 that seem to apply well to the case 
of Brazil.
Practically every socio-economic and political policy 
and program proposed and implemented since that time 
has had nation-building implications.14
The implications of nationalism with regards to 
the Brazilian peasantry are profound, and to some degree 
manifestly permanent. Political activities generally 
associated with regionalism did receive support after 
1946, and traditional oligarchical structures remained 
relatively intact. It might be said, in fact, that many 
of the changes that took place in the political milieu 
of the Northeast between 1946 and 1964 were excessively 
vulnerable to the traditional political interests. After 
noting that few of the political institutions that grew
up in the nationalist period between 1946 and 1964 
were able to survive into the 1970s, Foreman concludes 
that:
The political movement of the 1950's and 1960's en­
gaged a large number of peasants partially and fleet- 
ingly in the political process, but as an "external" 
factor which could not be easily accommodated. In an 
important sense, the extent of their participation 
far outweighed its significance.*5
And so, on the one hand the nationalist period between
1946 and 1964 provided for a permanent and profound
politicization of the countryside, and on the other that
period left few formal structures which endured.
A second dimension of the confrontation between 
nationalism and regionalism in the Northeast prior to 1964 
is evident in the resistance that the SUDENE encountered 
from traditional landed interests. In contrast to the 
conflict between the growing nationalism of the peasants 
and the regional focus of the SUDENE, the traditional land­
ed interests interpreted the SUDENE program as a direct 
challenge to Northeastern regional autonomy. They resist­
ed that program in the one area where it was most vulner­
able— the rural sector.
It was the traditional elite's continued influence 
within official as well as private circles that thwart­
ed the SUDENE efforts to change the agricultural life 
of the Northeast. The agricultural reform objectives 
remained statements of purpose and hope rather than 
becoming programs.16
Whether or hot it was purposeful or tactical, the ability
of regional interests to withstand the SUDENE rural program
constituted a powerful blow to the success of the whole 
program. Based on pressure from the rural landowning 
class, the SUDENE followed a course on non-agricultural 
planning, and this inevitably turned in the direction 
of industrialization, according to Roetto1-?
A clear example of the ability of rural landowners
to resist, the changes implicit in the SUDENE program is
evident in the sugar industry. As the region's chief
cash crop, primary recipient of government subsidization,
and most dependent industry on a plentiful supply of low-
wage labor, the uslneiros, or sugar producers, had long
been sensitive to their vulnerable position. They had
long ago rationalized their position with the argument
that they provided the means of life to laborers who
would otherwise have starved.
The government kept the usineiros in business, enabl­
ing them to keep their workersin a state of semi­
starvation, and thus in readiness for the next crisis. 
It was a vicious cycle, and its preservation was the 
function of the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, a federal 
agency created during the Great Depressions and as one 
might expect, under the political control of the North, 
eastern sugar industry. 8
The poverty of the workers, furthermore, was a critical
element in the government subsidization of the industry.
By maintaining living standards of the workers at a level
close to non-subsistence, they retained a powerful claim
on federal crop insurance. According to Joe Page, "the
government had to keep the sugar industry of the Northeast
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afloat to prevent all these people from starving to 
19death." The SUDENE plan to transform the Northeastern 
peasants into literate and economically independent people 
was logically seen by the sugar industry as a threat to 
its survival, at least in its present form*
Development efforts in the Northeast since 1964 
have tended to recognize the importance of national, or 
at least supraregional, economic planning. The Plan of 
National Integration, or PIN, is probably the outstanding 
example.
A dramatic national initiative to influence the 
course of, development in the Northeast was announced 
by the Medici government in June 1970....The integra­
tion plan was to bring together two interests of the 
Brazilian governments the integration and development 
of the Amazon Basin and the resolution of outstanding 
social and economic questions, in the Northeast.20
The main goal of the program was to "provide additional
infrastructure in the North and Northeast" through the
construction of a highway from Cuiaba to Santarem, and
"the irrigation of 135 million hectares in the Northeast 
21by 1974." The. program, however, did not recognize the 
political conditions in the Northeast, and especially the 
traditional tendency of the large landowners to actively 
and effectively resist socially relevant change.
The primary goals of the PIN sought to resolve 
social problems in the Northeast by removing them physi­
cally.
The emphasis on colonization and the absorption of ex-
4 7
cess labor within PIN represented an admission by 
the military regime that it would not attempt to 
apply its land reform statutes to the sugar areas.
The tradtional social and political relationships 
would be dealt with indirectly by removing the 
poor families from the Northeast. 2
And although the relocation plans in the PIN have not yet 
been effected, financing arrangements for the PIN termin­
ated the SUDENE, at least in a meaningful sense. ^  The 
military government seems to be committed to moving 
away from regional economic and social planning, and al­
though the PIN has been substantially undercut by alter­
native projects, there has been no evidence of a return 
to the SUDENE. As former Finance Minister Delfim Neto 
emphasized, "Brazil is one nation only, and the proposal
of the government is to develop all regions, and not only
24this one or that one." The next step is for the 
official recognition of the gross inequities in the Brazil­
ian rural sector, a step that so far has been slow in evolv­
ing.
The Question of Violence, 1961--1966. The analysis of 
violence immediately prior to 1964 is clouded by several 
difficult questions. Publicity and exaggerated press cov­
erage, inadequate records, and a tendency, especially just 
before the coup of 1964, to categorize relatively normal 
occurrences as extraordinary all tended to obscure the 
actual dimensions of violence that might have been related 
to substantially new patterns of political interaction.
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It is nevertheless possible to make several generali­
zations regarding political violence in Northeast Brazil 
during this period, and to outline the role of the SUDENE 
in this context.
The first point is that political violence on the 
part of nordestino peasants during 1961— 1964 was relative­
ly rare outside of traditional and parochial expression.
It can be conjectured that few experienced direct contact 
with innovative political ideas and organizers. The for­
mation of the Peasant Leagues was one of the few excep­
tions to what Foreman identifies as the "culture of si- 
lence" that ruled the interior. Francisco Juliao, the 
legal counsel and honorary head of the Leagues, was a 
Castroite and a product of the Northeastern rural environ-, 
ment. According to Page, "his sentimental attachment to 
rural life was deep-rooted and constant, a quality not 
uncommon among intellectuals of the Northeast. As 
legal defense attorney for peasants and the leftist 
Peasant Leagues, Juliao had rejected any hopes that he 
might otherwise have had for legal efficacy in the North-, 
east.
A governor of Pernambuco once remarked: "To my enem­
ies, the law; to my friends, facilities," The aphorism 
nicely catches the yawning chasm in Brazil between the 
letter of the law and its application. The administra­
tion of Brazilian justice was comparatively flexible, 
but it bent.only one way— in the direction of wealth and power. &
According to Page, Juliao established a reputation for
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27"defending Northeastern peasants after 19^1. and 
later played a part in the organization and direction of 
the Peasant Leagues. It remains doubtful, however, that 
Juliao retained more than a minor part of the control of 
the leagues. Besides their highly democratic character, 
another element that supports this thesis is the wide 
area that they encompassed, and the difficulty of trans­
portation in the region.
Nobody really knew how many Peasant Leagues were al­
ready in existence, and how many peasants belonged. 
Claims ranged from Juliao’s solemn estimate that 
League membership had passed the 100,000 mark to 
the statement of a Catholic Priest working with 
rural workers in Pernambuco to the effect that as of 
January 1962 he would be very surprised if twenty 
Leagues still existed in the state.
The Area Handbook for Brazil(ftArm.y Handbook") is slightly 
more conservative than Juliao, citing 80,000 peasants as 
peak membership.2^ It seems likely that the most common 
characteristic of the Leagues was isolation from the cen­
tral leadership.
Prior to 1962, League-inspired violence can be al­
most wholly discounted, despite the charges of the news 
media in the N o r t h e a s t . B u t  in 1962 the Leagues "had 
very definitely taken to the offensive."31 The offensive, 
as it soon became clear, was a mixture of spontaneous re­
actions to the ongoing process of oligarchical repression, 
and a close identification with Cuba and Castroism, the 
latter being probably mostly romanticization. In 1962,
the "Dianopolis Caper", in which a former communist and 
member of the Peasant League organizational staff became 
instrumental in the formation of a guerilla training 
camp, caused extreme embarrassment and subsequent poli­
tical problems for the Leagues , ^  It might be added 
that the discipline of the. camp was very low, the level 
of indoctrination and training could in no way be con­
strued as threatening to Brazilian authorities, and- the
ultimate police intervention which terminated the camp
33was based on an unrelated political issue. The camp, 
in fact, appeared to have no other potential function ex­
cept that of furnishing the material for a scandal. Later 
in 1962, a commercial plane crash in Peru led to the dis­
closure of papers which identified the Leagues as recip­
ients of limited financial support from Cuba.
This embarrassing disclosure resulted in the sus­
pension of the modest financial support the Peasant 
Leagues had been receiving from Cuba as of late 1961. 
Castro had been reluctant, even then, to contribute 
to the Leagues because he had doubts about-their rev­
olutionary potential. Now he was certain.^
The political offensive of 1962 can perhaps be better de­
scribed as political scandal, a series of unrelated in­
cidents which weakened the Leagues and substantiated the 
impression that they had created of weakness and dis­
parity.
A second point that denigrates the allegation of 
widespread political violence in the Northeast between
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1961 and 1964- is the degree to which such an allegation 
was in the interests of development projects in the re-
Igion. The Alliance for Progress in the Northeast, for 
example, depended upon the hope that "success would demon­
strate the effectiveness of the democratic- model of gov­
ernment and diffuse the threat posed to the Alliance by 
the spreading, allegedly communist-inspired Peasant League 
in the .Northeast. The SUDENE likewise had an interest 
in mass popular reaction to the reputation of violence 
that the media could create for the Leagues. Roett notes 
that "Juliao served Furtado's purposes in that the exist­
ence of the Peasant Leagues was another good reason for 
supporting the SUDENE." Furtado was attempting to at­
tract both ends of the political spectrum through his 
posture toward the Peasant Leagues, and this endeavor re­
quired an ongoing process of political juggling.
To denounce the leagues would merely earn the super­
intendency the opprobrium of the left, but to endorse 
them would mean the loss of support from the center 
and the more enlightened elements of the right. The 
best course for Furtado was one of using the leagues 
to pressure the right for further concessions. He 
could attempt to satisfy the left by saying that the 
aims and overall purpose of the SUDENE coincided with 
the leagues but that their methods were totally dif­
ferent and suited different approaches. Furtado made 
it clear, time and again, that he considered himself 
to be a member of the political left, working for a 
social transformation of Brazilian society not for a 
violent upheaval that would destroy as much as it 
might anticipate.37
And even the violence implied by Furtado was probably far
from revolutionary in the context of the Northeast. Roett
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notes that the Leagues were ”a natural outgrowth of the 
political culture, traditional and patriarchal, of the 
Northeast," The absence of revolutionary strategy may 
have reflected the traditional models to which the Peasant 
Leagues closely adhered. Roett concludes that "there was
nothing of the ’revolutionary peasant class consciousness'
39about the leagues...,"
It was, instead, an almost classic case of populism 
penetrating into the peasantry for the first time. 
JuliSo attempted to replace the landlords in direct­
ing the peasants how to conduct themselves political­
ly. He played the role of an intermediary between 
peasant and government, a broker who rarely attempted 
to truly organize or institutionalize the l e a g u e s .
A third point underscores the extent to which much 
of the political violence that occurred in Northeast Brazil 
between 1961 and 1964 took the form of suppression of po­
litical activities. In a patriarchal society, the oligar­
chy has often engaged in armed reaction to what it con­
ceived as political threats, and organization of the 
Peasant Leagues meant that landowners would again find 
recourse to violence.
What contributed to. £thq} "reign of terror" in the 
early years of the Peasant League movement was the 
attitude of the Governor of Pernambuco, General 
Cordeiro. de Farias. His enemies liked to point out 
how badly misnamed he was, since cordeiro in Portu­
guese means "lamb”. He took an inflexible position 
in favor of law and order as it traditionally existed 
in the countryside. His state police supported the 
status quo to the hilt and did their best to crush 
any peasant resistance to the exercise of prerogatives 
by the landowners. *
While complete statistics have never been tabulated, there
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are numerous accounts of League meetings which were 
terminated by the gunfire of hired hands. Incidents of 
peasant initiated violence also have been documented, al­
though they tended to occur only in extreme cases of de­
privation. Page comments on this type of violence.
...if these conditions spawned ferment in the North­
east, they also placed certain limitations upon those 
seeking change. Starving, disease-ridden peasants do 
not make the best soldiers in the army of national 
liberation.^
While this statement need not be considered a universal 
verity, it can nevertheless receive a modicum of support 
with regards to the case of Northeast Brazil. The 
peasants of the Northeast were traditionally dominated 
and extremely poor; in the absence of theoretical direc­
tion, they would be unlikely to relate violence to politi­
cal change.
Creation of the SUDENE and 
Its Basic Sources of Strength
The Basic Plan. I960 was seen by many as a year of great 
importance for the people of Northeast Brazil. The suffer­
ing and privation resulting from the severe drought of 1959 
had stimulated renewed national recognition of the prob­
lems of the region, and had resulted in the establishment 
of a program, directly subordinated to the President of 
Brazil, that was charged with the responsibility of poli­
tical and economic change in the Northeast. Its goal was
54
THE' STRUCTURE OF THE SUDENE
TH£ EIGHT PeDf-M1- mtNCbTRiCs
NINE. NIL Q ov£*N»fc
S h FflfiH viftu-ey Puth- W.
DNOCS
REP. HE REP.
6 ftN K -*fBR*Z.lLfy Nfvr'u pe\ ftftNK- m
stfo TRAN HYPtoElR 
CO. REf.
NRT’LRW ■ ED RRc£5 Cb£Al snwr
N E c e s w y
REPOKT5 
TO D. Coi^HClL.
DEUBERATtVE
COM MCI L-z
sapeRiNteNfiBri.
(CEtSO FMftTTVD̂ )
ftcTlNQ
s u e E K .
/ y STpFF
St. 14 /  \
STAFF
EyOECi/VTIVE-.
S e C R C T A R I A T
X
STftFfAT
ANHUAL. PROGRESS
REPORT
O F  T \< E  SUDElM F
V
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to create an infrastructure capable of overcoming the 
numerous political and economic problems indigenous to 
the region. The SUDENE immediately became the shibboleth 
of hope for numerous and by and large conflicting inter­
ests. It represented at its core, however, only those 
interests of the poor, as the conservative oligarchy 
would soon discover.
The SUDENE was an attempt by the development-minded 
Juscelino Kubitschek administration to create a new 
organization with the ability to confront and resolve 
the pressing social and economic problems of the 
Northeast and, at the same time, isolate and neutral­
ize the traditional oligarchy of interests that op­posed modernization. 3
Nevertheless, aside from this small, although cohesive,
group of major landholders, the SUDENE would eventually
claim to support the interests of virtually all of the
interests of the region.
The responsibility for the original form and em­
phasis of the program rested almost entirely with Celso 
Furtado, a Sorbonne-trained economist from the Northeast 
who submitted the official government report on the effects 
of the severe drought of 1959. Subsequently named to 
direct the agency, Furtado. was entrusted with reconstruct­
ing the Northeastern economy by three successive Brazilian 
presidents. A discussion of the SUDENE inevitably in­
cludes the career of Celso Furtado because of his promi- 
nant position with regards to the agency, and also the 
tendency within Latin America for bureaucracies to depend
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heavily upon isolated leadership positions, a condition 
that is generally referred to as personalismo.
Furtado chose to emphasize three major points in his 
overall plan for the SUDENE, and the scope of each of 
them was sufficient in itself to comprise the makings of 
a comprehensive development program, Stefan Robock, in 
his report to the Brookings Institution in 1963 noted 
that i
Furtado's plan for action "is built around three 
basic policies." (1^Intensification of industrial ' 
investments: to increase regional employment oppor­
tunities, reduce the adverse flow of private capital 
out of the Northeast, and make the region less vulner­
able to the drought. (2)Reorganization of agriculture: 
detailed plans which are to be developed should empha­
size greater food production in the humid areas— to 
stabilize food supplies in drought periods— and a 
transformation of the semi-arid zones to increase pro­
ductivity and drought resistance. (3)Relocation of 
population surpluses: the Northeast should be re­
defined to include, the state of Maranhao to the north 
which, possessed of moist soils, could absorb popula­
tion surpluses created by a reorganization of the 
semiarid agricultural economy.^
Although agricultural reorganization and population relo­
cation played minor roles in the following SUDENE programs, 
intensification of industrial development remained the 
central focus of the SUDENE even after the military coup 
of 1964.
In pursuing the industrialization of the North­
east as a primary goal, Furtado emphasized the humanistic 
aspect of the program— the creation of a broad spectrum 
of jobs and the close interrelation of the prospective
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industies with the local economy.
A key part of Furtado's Master Plan for the Northeast 
sought to industrialize the region in an attempt to 
utilize the manpower which was a by-product of over­
population and unemployment. If jobs could be created,, 
then employees with newly-created purchasing power 
would demand goods and services which would in turn 
create additional jobs. Under the law a corporation 
could invest in the Northeast a certain percentage of 
its tax liability to the federal government.......
But SUDENE would retain the authority to approve or 
disapprove of specific investment projects before 
this tax exemption would w o r k .  5
Furtado had indicted the single-crop system, commonly prac-
ticed in Northeast Brazil, in his work Formacao Economica
do Bras.il, published in 1959* and argued the merits, and
some of the liabilities, of such a plan of industriali-
zation. It was clear from the beginning that this first
point was the priority goal of the SUDENE.
Generalized plans for regional industrialization 
have tended to acquire political currency very rapidly in 
Batin America, and Furtado was aware of both his assets 
and liabilities from following such a course. He em­
phasized repeatedly the technical focus of his agency, 
and although this ultimately earned the emnity of both 
the right and left-wing political activists in the region, 
its initial success was of great value, as Roett observes.
One of the strongest weapons possessed by the SUDENE 
was its nonpolitical or technical approach to planning; 
it was a regional approach that not only avoided local 
and state antagonisms but argued for more rational use 
of federal funds. The other federal agencies had to be 
disciplined not because they were political and often 
aligned with opposition groups but because a systematic
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coordination of national efforts required their^„ 
subordination to a central agency: the SUDENE. '
Nevertheless, Roett emphasized that "the new superinten­
dent was in a dangerous position."
The clamor for economic change required social and po­
litical development at the same time. His task was to 
plan the new modes of political behavior to provide 
permanent support for the economic program. Broad 
change, not just technical, narrow plans, was at the 
center of the SUDENE role in the region.^8
The ways in which the SUDENE was empowered offici­
ally to effect change in the political milieu of the North­
east were necessarily abstract. The SUDENE itself was a 
product of the Brazilian political system, and thus was 
subject to its vagaries and weaknesses. Paramount among 
these was the tendency in Brazilian politics to write laws 
in such a way as to maximize political promise while mini­
mizing the specific provisions of change. A brief des­
cription of the official functions of the SUDENE serves 
to illustrate this point.
In order to carry out its purposes, the SUDENE was em­
powered to: examine and submit to the president sug­
gestions related to the development problems; control, 
without detriment to the responsibilities granted to 
other agencies, the balances from budget grants, spe­
cial credits, and other additional credits, fundings, 
and special bank accounts of the executors of projects 
included in the Master Plan; supervise the use of fi­
nancial resources specifically destined for the devel­
opment of the Northeast; suggest,..the necessary legis­
lative steps for the establishment, adaptation, chang­
ing or closing of agencies* taking into consideration 
their efficiency or capacity, fitness to fulfill their 
objectives, and, especially, the part assigned to them 
for the execution of the Master Plan; and perform all 
duties pursuant to its ends.^9
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The allusions to the principal advisory role of the SUDENE 
were expressive of how the Brazilian Congress perceived 
of the new agency's purpose. Nevertheless, the SUDENE 
had been given as much political power as any new agency 
within the bureaucracy might expect* the ability, given 
the adroit and careful use of its advisory capacity, to 
achieve at least a minimum of its required output— moder­
ate political and economic change in the Northeast. Fur­
tado realized immediately that while his emphasis on tech­
nological functions might avoid some of the more familiar 
manifestations of Brazilian politics, his position as di­
rector of a new agency required that he rapidly adapt to 
the political conventions. The structure of the SUDENE's 
Deliberative Council underscored the degree to which Fur­
tado* s time and energies would.be required by political 
campaigning.
The Deliberative Council was the policy-making body 
of the new agency. The council originally consisted 
of twenty-five members* one representative each of 
the nine state governments in the Northeast; the 
superintendent of the SUDENE; the director general 
of the DNOCS; the superintendent of the SSo Francisco 
Valley Commission; a representative of the general 
staff of the armed forces; and one representative each 
of the eight federal ministries, the Bank of the North­
east, the National Bank for Economic Development, the 
Bank of Brazil, and the S&o Francisco HydroelectricCompany.50
in terms of the American regional development programs, 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, this composition 
was fairly typical. However, it was an innovative politi­
cal formula in the experience of Northeast Brazilian ad­
ministration, and one that helped to a great extent to 
bridge the hiatus between technical and political ac­
tivities. The ambitions of individuals and rival insti­
tutions were defused by the provision of voting rights in 
the Deliberative Council, and the regular absences of the 
agency representatives and bank representatives meant in 
effect that a greater share of the power in the decision­
making process was given to the governors of the Northeast. 
Furthermore, these memberscof the Council "could and did 
claim to be the legitimate voice of the region in that 
they were the only elected members of the group.
Political issues could theoretically be handled in a more 
democratic and, in view of the political expertise of the 
elected officials, more politically sophisticated manner.
The Deliberative Council, in effect consolidated
and simplified by the tendency of certain voting delegates
not to attend meetings, became vulnerable the control of
Furtado through the SUDENE"s executive secretariat.-^ The
secretariat controlled the technical apparatus of the SUDENE
as well as establishing many operational priorities.
The power to draw up the Master Plan rested with the 
secretariat, as did the following: to co-ordinate and
supervise the execution of programs and projects in 
the Master Plan; to draw up the annual, progress report 
of the agency; to provide technical assistance to fed­
eral, state, and municipal agencies; to maintain con­
tact with the federal agencies subordinate to the 
Master Plan in order to co-ordinate their activities 
and facilitate maximum efficiency in their conduct;
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and to assist the council by supplying it with the 
information, studies and projections necessary to 
the performance of its duties.53
By 1961, governors of the Northeastern states were them­
selves products of fierce political struggle, and many of 
them were awed and attracted by the calm and efficient 
machinery of the SUDENE organization; they rapidly tended 
to become proponents of Furtado's administration.
Planning was the central focus of the SUDENE, and 
the Master Plans were in many respects nuclei of the organ­
ization. Each Master Plan was designed with a primary po­
litical purpose. In Roett's words, it was charged with 
guaranteeing "the maintenance of the coalition that had 
endorsed the organization of the agency and the passage 
in Congress of the first plan."^ It was the Master Plan 
which could provide any political opposition with the 
specific material necessary to indict the SUDENE, for "the 
precise direction of the agency and the specific projects
of the plan were debatable and could arouse antagonism 
<55and division." Furtado was aware of this condition,
and was able to a great extent to utilize the plans to
circumvent political opposition,,
The superintendency’s strategy of supporting basic in­
dustry and infrastructure(nonantagonistic projects) fo­
cused on areas that the traditional groups could little 
afford to oppose; the projects were of a similar na­
ture to those supported by the federal government.
The prime source of political support of the landed 
groups remained the federal government. But on the 
issue of opposing the SUDENE the usual meeting of in­
terests did not take place. The traditional political
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elites in the Northeast found few collaborators 
within the federal regime save in the federal 
agencies operating in the region, and these en­
tities were to be disciplined and directed by the 
SUDENE within its Master Plan.5®
Nevertheless, it became incumbent upon Furtado to fully 
develop the tools of political persuasion within the le­
gal strictures of his position. As Robock noted, Furtado 
undertook a task that would require constant vigilance.
Although President Janio Quadros gave Celso Furtado 
cabinet member status, neither Quadros nor his succes­
sor, Jo&o Goulart, exerted strong political leadership 
to have Congress approve the Northeast plan. To win 
the political battle, Furtado and his dedicated asso­
ciates developed five main sources of political 
strength: the state governors in the Northeast, fed­
eral legislators from the South, university student 
groups, Brazilian nationalists, and the United States 
foreign aid program.-*'
Although the basic strengths of the SUDENE were dependent
upon both its leadership and this strategic position, some
of its fundamental weaknesses radiated from these same
sources.
Inherent Weaknesses: Political Versatility v. Personal!smo.
Dynamic leadership was crucial to the effective function of 
the new agency, based on its abstract structure and duties. 
Both the immediate and projected obstacles to even the 
most limited political and economic change in the North­
east Brazil were staggering. The requisites of maintain­
ing the necessary political coalitions to support the 
SUDENE included sensitive political maneuvering. Furtado 
became preoccupied with both his complex and technical
plans for the development of the Northeast, and the equal­
ly complex task of retaining the political power necessary 
for the function of the agency. In this environment, it 
was inevitable that Furtado would become indispensible to 
the agency. His impressive professional and political 
credentials lent themselves to the Brazilian tendency for 
bureaucracies to become centered around specific person­
alities, a condition widely described as personalismo.
While constituting nothing out of the ordinary, 
personalismo based on Furtado deprived the SUDENE of an 
important base of strength* the anonymous institutional 
legitimacy characteristic of industrialized nations. 
Furthermore, his appointment by President Goulart to draft 
a five-year plan for the Brazilian economy in 1962, a time 
at which the SUDENE desperately needed to display politi­
cal viability, was a disaster for the new institution.
When Furtado was away from the Northeast, his chief 
deputy became Acting Superintendent, yet lacked the 
power to make important decisions. Furtado could nul­
lify anything the Acting Superintendent did during his 
absence. Often decisions that should have been n)gde 
in the urgency of the moment had to be deferred.58
A persistent and aggressive coalition of opposing interests 
had formed by 1962, and was able to make destructive in­
roads into the function of the SUDENE. A key constituent 
of this coalition, it would later be seen, was the U.S. 
Alliance for Progress.
Personalismo within the SUDENE further damaged the
6k
prospects for development in the Northeast in the 
long run. After the military coup of 1964, the new 
regime promised to fulfill many of the priorities of the 
SUDENE, and to maintain the agency in a similar form.
The removal of Furtado from the superintendent®s office 
proved to be more significant than the goals of the insti­
tution, however.
The shock caused by Furtado's dismissal, the subse­
quent psychological depression suffered by the agency 
and a cutback in funds as a result of the governments 
anti-inflationary policy came close to destroying the 
SUDENE. That it has managed to survive at all must 
count as a bright spot in the post-1964- period.59
Industrialization, it will be recalled, was one of the
SUDENE projects that required little agency financing.
A second critical shortcoming of development ef­
forts through the SUDENE related to the scarcity of train­
ed technicians in the Northeast. The SUDENE tended to 
consolidate technical expertise within an agency that 
acquired strong political opposition, and in some regards 
the whole development process became tied to the success 
of one institution. Robock explains:
The SUDENE choice may prove to be the best for the 
Brazilian environment, but it has resulted in large 
expenditures of scarce talent and energy on political 
battles. Also, the political fight created high ex­
pectations for rapid development and forced SUDENE to 
concentrate in its first year of operations on quick 
and dramatic actions, leaving many fundamental longer- 
range needs unmet.®0
This is not a new or unique problem in what has been cal­
led "modernization". David Apter has written that non­
industrial modernizing societies tend to have more cha­
otic and personalized social organizations, and that 
"politics becomes the mechanism of integration, and 
authority is the critical problem confronting leaders. 
Although Furtado acted dynamically to seize and reinforce 
the necessary authority, his position was dictated by the 
implicit contradictions of, and dichotomy between, poli­
tical and developmental roles. Guy Hunter noted in 
Modernizing Peasant Societies that
The most difficult balance to strike is that between 
social and political aims on the one hand and econom­
ic ambitions and opportunities on the other.62
A third important weakness regarding the SUDENE
was one that was indigenous to the sistema of Brazilian
bureaucracy. Peter Ranis observed that
The great numbers within Brazil’s public bureaucracy 
function as a sophisticated, literate, politicized, 
and eloquent minority in a country where political 
apathy is not unknown. They know well what they 
want and are able to communicate these wants to the 
decision makers.6 3
The articulation of independent political interests voiced 
by the funcionarios of the SUDENE and the DNOCS, its rival 
in the Northeast, seriously weakened the SUDENE. When 
the DNOCS entered into the opposing coalition of interests 
along with the U.S. Alliance for Progress, the develop­
ment process ceased to follow any kind of plan.
Growth of the Coalition of Opposing Interests. Central to 
the ability of the SUDENE to operate effectively in the
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Northeast was the degree to which it could amalgamate and 
direct the aggressive private interests of the region.
The internal organization of the SUDENE was such that it 
concentrated this important and difficult task in the of­
fice of the superintendent. It became incumbent upon Fur­
tado to overcome both the inherent structural deficiencies 
of the new agency, and simultaneously to direct natural 
political resistance away from it.
Despite QhisJ formidable assets, Celso Furtado soon 
discovered that he had to develop and utilize a keen 
sense of politics in order to survive. SUDENE had the 
authority to disperse most of the money allocated to 
the Northeast by the federal government. Yet in exer- 
. cising this authority, Furtado had to walk a slack 
wire, swayed by the vagaries of national politics, the 
meteoric rise of Miguel Arraes, and the agitation of 
Juliao and his Peasant Leagues in the countryside.
At the same time the more boisterous of his enemies on 
the right kept insisting that he was an agent of the 
Communist Party, a small group of highly intelligent 
industrialists and landowners in the Northeast set out 
from the very beginning to chip away quietly, steadily, 
iously at the foundations of his fledgling
Many of the fundamental activities of the agency drastical 
ly increased political resistance to it. Furthermore, 
Furtado's defense of the agency placed him in a difficult 
position. As the driving force behind the organization, 
and the personalized director, he discovered that many 
of his arguments were suspect— his personal stakes in the 
SUDENE tended to cut into his effectiveness as its over­
seer. This was especially the case with regards to the 
SUDENE's role as manager and coordinator of entire region-
6?
al development program, as Robock observed in 1963.
By demanding complete and direct authority over all 
aspects of the regional development and by establish­
ing a regional plan which, despite a commitment in 
principle to decentralized planning, was imposed from 
the top down, the SUDENE movement was destined to 
evoke the maximum of political resistance
Historical perspective confirms the inability of 
the SUDENE and Furtado to overcome this problem,, The mil­
itary regime that took control of government in 1964 sup­
ported some of the original plans of the SUDENE, such as 
the stimulation of industrialization in the Northeast, 
because of their practical bases. It was never able to 
support a fully integrated and coordinated development 
plan, however technically satisfying such an effort 
seemed to be. Furtado*s focus on the technological bases 
of development had been effectively eclipsed by unified 
political resistance. Perhaps the clearest and most doc­
umented example of this involved the progressive aliena­
tion of the USAID(United States Agency for International 
Development) mission to Northeast Brazil by the SUDENE 
program.
Although the deterioration of relations between 
the two agencies will be dealt with in the following chap­
ter, several factors of this breakdown should be mentioned 
at this juncture. First, the U.S. mission in Recife and 
the funcionarios of the SUDENE maintained significantly 
different conceptions of their respective roles. While
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the SUDENE "awaited the USAID's identification of those 
Master Plan projects that the United States was most in­
terested in subsidizing,...the USAID awaited the SUDENE's 
initiative in drawing up a list of USAID projects to be 
accomodated by the Master Plan.
In retrospect, it was essential that any effective 
collaboration between the USAID and the SUDENE depend 
upon an immediate understanding of operational policy. 
The longer the two agencies entertained comforting 
misconceptions about their role, small differences 
were able to grow into formidable obstacles. By the 
end of 1962, a sufficient number of those differences 
had accumulated to seriously impede accomodation.6?
An unwillingness of rival institutions to accept the 
SUDENE's official role in the regional development pro­
cess was certainly a contributing element to the;subse­
quent dysfunction of the agency. However, perhaps an 
even more important factor was the SUDENE's inability to 
recognize the myopia of organizations such as the USAID.
It is this shortcoming of the SUDENE, especially in view 
of the agency's intelligent and centralized leadership, 
that suggests the degree to which technological develop­
ment plans distracted attention away from basic political 
considerations.
The Master Plans. Central to a basic understanding of 
the ways in which the development roles of the SUDENE 
were perceived by people and institutions in the Northeast 
were the periodic Master Plans, or pianos diretores. These 
were statements of purpose and general goals in the devel­
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opment effort, along with specific project proposals, 
and required periodic approval of the Brazilian Congress, 
Pour Master Plans for the periods 1960-1962, 1963-1965, 
1966-1968, and 1969-1973 have included a variety of pro­
posals reflecting a basic change in viewpoint and modus 
operandi after 1964, The first Master Plan included*
1. A socioeconomic justification of the investment 
policies of the federal government in the North­
east and the definition of multiannual objectives 
to be achieved in the basic sectors in which pub­
lic investments are concentrated.
2. An analysis of private investment possibilities, 
indicating measures to encourage such investment 
and the areas of highest priority, in order to 
receive aid from the various financing banks,
3. Criteria for federal-cooperation with the states and municipalities.08
It was with regards to the battle for congressional ap­
proval of this plan that the political dimension of the 
SUDENE first became strikingly apparent. After prolonged 
debate, the Senate critically weakened the Master Plan 
with the use of amendments on November 28, 1961. The 
public outcry that followed had the effect of forcing a 
reconsideration and passage of the plan without amend­
ments. The general strikes in Recife and nationwide 
public dissent had stopped what Roett describes as "the
attempts of the oligarchies of the Northeast to render
69the new agency helpless."
Furthermore, the Master Plans demonstrated the 
seriousness with which Furtado intended to undertake the 
technical dimensions of development in the Northeast.
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Robock was able to quantify the emphasis on technical
development infrastructure in the first plan.
...the "creation of an economic infrastructure" 
through road building and electric power expansion, 
activities for which the Northeast has developed 
planning competence and specific plans, accounted 
for 70 percent of the total planned investment in 
the first plan and about 76 percent of the first 
congressional appropriation.7o
Robock further noted that social development, an area 
that would involve the greatest degree of political re­
sistance, accounted for only 17 percent of planned in­
vestment, and educational programs for about 1.3 per- 
71cent. A breakdown of projects within the first Master 
Plan reveals that "infrastructure, water and sewage pro­
jects and agriculture, including food distribution, ac* 
counted for 99 percent of total planned expenditures in 
the first plan."'*2
The Master Plans may have been misleading, however, 
to the extent that they did not include the emphasis that 
Furtado and the organization of the SUDENE placed on the 
stimulation of industrial investment in the Northeast. 
Totally absent from the plans, for example, is mention of 
the tax incentive and loan programs. Robock explained 
why.
Commerce and industry in the Northeast is almost ex­
clusively in the hands of private enterprise. There­
fore, the SUDENE plan, essentially a synthesis of the 
major federal expenditures in the region, does not re­
flect fully, on the basis of the share of total expen­
ditures, the industrialization activities of the SUDENE. 
The SUDENE law gave the agency authority to direct the
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BNB and the National Development Bank to give 
priority in loans to approved industrial projects 
and to give the following special inducements to 
encourage industrial expansion in the regions 
(1) special foreign exchange allocations or con­
cessions; (2) exemptions from import tariffs and 
taxes; (3) exemptions from certain domestic tsxes.
Industrialization remained central to Furtado's conception
of "modernization" in the region, and with regards to this
vital issue, the Master Plans tended to detract from a
primary goal by emphasizing the SUDENE's association with
secondary goals.
In a larger sense, however, the Master Plans were
important opportunities for the SUDENE to advertise its
technical focus, and to build a consensus necessary for
its effective function. The precise representation of
the SUDENE plan was less important than the way in which
the agency was generally perceived. Page observes that:
Celso Furtado's attempt to develop the Northeast 
through the mechanism of rational planning and imple­
mentation of an independent federal agency exercising 
wide powers failed because of the fatal interdependence 
of economic and political development. As he noted 
later, in a somewhat rueful understatement: "The 
struggle for power between the populist leaders and 
the traditional ruling class is the crux of a politi­
cal conflict which tends to thwart every attempt at 
coherent planning by those who from time to time 
govern the country.74
The Military Coup: 1964 and After. On April 2, 1964, the
Armed Forces of Brazil formally assumed complete control 
of the nation's political institutions after having suc­
cessfully concluded a "bloodless" coup against the admini-
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stration of President Joao Goulart. The full implica­
tions of this power transition vis^a-vis the SUDENE soon 
became apparent. Furtado was immediately removed from 
his government positions and prohibited from public ser­
vice for a period not less than ten years. He subsequent­
ly went into voluntary exile from Brazil. The position 
of superintendent of the SUDENE has been occupied by a 
succession of generals since 1964; as have many other 
of the leadership positions in Brazilian government. This 
does not represent a highly irregular set of circumstances 
in Brazil, however. One observer has noted that
the military has, except for a few unusual years, 
stood in the forefront of the Brazilian political 
process. 75
Nevertheless, that process has undergone significant re­
direction since 1964, and with it the institutions of 
government.
The SUDENE was substantially changed after 1964.
Although some energy was directed toward the original goal
of industrialization in the Northeast, the fear of left-
wing infiltration of the agency tended to stifle socially
meaningful projects. Page offers an example.
Occasionally a glimmer of meaningful reform flickers, 
such as SUDENE's attempt in 1968 to include in its 
Fourth Master Plan a requirement that new industry 
adopt profit sharing plans for their workers and de­
velop ways to involve their workers In the management 
of the enterprise. This was by no means a subversive 
plot. SUDENE was merely implementing changes that 
were specifically declared desirable by the new feder­
al constitution promulgated by the military government
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in 1967. But a howl of protest both in the Northeast 
and the center-south forced SUDENE to withdraw theproposal,76
Much of the importance of the SUDENE as an instrument of 
political and socioeconomic change after 1964 can be dis­
counted, Arraes has noted that the overwhelming majority 
of Brazilian industries are foreign owned. The SUDENE 
program, in this context, constituted government assistance 
to many foreign owned corporations. Arraes observes that 
•'the entry of foreign capital has been of no advantage at
all to the country since the sums leaving it always exceed
77what comes in,"
Two rebuttals have been commonly employed by advo­
cates of the military regime in Brazil to discount criti­
cism of the SUDENE's descent toward inactivity after 1964, 
The first is based on the belief that the national econ­
omy had to achieve an exclusive status in development ef­
forts before a major regional development plan would be 
feasible. Proponents of this perspective can point to 
a major upswing in the Brazilian economy after 1968— cal­
led an "economic miracle" by some— but they have little 
recourse to subsequent examples of development in the 
Northeast or rural sectors. The economic "boom" argument 
is, in fact, inconclusive. In the first place, the boom 
has not evinced a national progress, but rather., has been 
essentially regional in character.
The so-called boom has contributed significantly to
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aggravating another disparity— that between regions 
within Brazil.,..between I960 and 1970 there was a 
reversal of the trend of the preceding decade toward 
a greater share of the national income for the North­
east.
It remains to be seen, of course, if the resources neces­
sary for the development of the Northeast have finally 
been accumulated and are merely awaiting application. 
However, there are further indications that this is not 
the case.
One of these indications is evident in the second 
rebuttal to the call for a "boom” period to precede re­
gional development plans. That is that the Brazilian 
"miracle" has begun to seriously weaken, and the con­
ditions in the Northeast may well be a contributing factor.
i
M.S. Marzouk noted in Orbis, Spring 1974 that
Brazil's.impressive growth does conceal a basic struc­
tural weakness— the inequality of income distribution. 
The structure of production is a dual one wherein mod­
ern techniques coexist with traditional methods.
Since industrialization has been accomplished by the 
adoption of modern techniques, the incomes of those 
connected with the modern sector have increased while 
the traditional sector's income has not kept?gace and 
may even have decreased in per capita terms.
In that the Northeast tends to be almost uniformly tra­
ditional in its productive output, regional disparities 
also appear to be part of Marzouk*s analysis.
A second defense to criticism of the post-1964 
SUDENE program has taken the form of a denigration of the 
original goals of the program, based on the assumption 
that they are suspect in their political content.
The implications of this argument are that a new and 
politically untarnished regional development program, one 
that is based on acceptable goals and policy, might suc­
ceed where a refurbished SUDENE program would not. How­
ever, regional plans constructed along these lines and 
executed after 1964 have been singularly unsuccessful in 
redressing the inequities of either the Northeast region 
vis-a-vis the South, or the rural sector in a national 
context. The GERAN program is an example of this.
Following the recommendations of a USAID study under­
taken by the Hawaiian Agronomics International Company, 
the military regime announced, with appropriate fan­
fare, the birth of GERAN, or the Special Group for the 
Rationalization of the Northeastern Sugar Industry. 
GERAN's goals were to bring about both the moderniza­
tion of the sugar zone and a genuine land reform. The 
idea was to stimulate the adoption of new machinery 
and methods which would enable mill owners to produce 
as much sugar as they were then producing, but on half 
as much land. The remaining land would then be avail­
able for crop diversification and distribution to the 
peasants.
The creation of a new federal agency to deal with 
the Northeast's most pressing problem indicated in 
no uncertain terms SUDENE's loss of power, prestige 
and importance.®0
Nevertheless, the GERAN completely ignored the factors 
that have motivated the sugar producers for decades to 
remain inefficient and to keep a large contingent of 
subsistence-level workers. The GERAN has met with pre­
dictable results. The president of the program "spent
most of his time dealing with mill modernization and lit-
81tie time on land reform and social change." Moreover, 
the pressures of regional politics were again evident in
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the progressive dysfunction of the program.
GERAN was announced in 1966. In early 196? it was in 
its organizational phase. Officials were expressing 
the hope that it would begin to show results in five 
years. That August the agency suffered an administra­
tive shake-up, which continued for two years. In May, 
1969# the government appointed an army colonel as chief 
administrator of GERAN. His claim to fame was that he 
had been in charge of security in Recife during the re­
pressive period immediately after the coup. In June, 
1969» GERAN was still in the organizational phase. By 
early 1971. only one Pernambucan sugar mill had had 
its modernization plans approved by GERAN, but no ac­
tion had been taken. At the same time, GERA(Executive 
Group for Agrarian Reform) had been created.
Regional and supraregional planning continues, although 
indications are that traditional power structures, includ­
ing the military, provide virtually all of the direction 
to current programs. National integration in development 
planning has been rendered an impossible and illegal 
task, despite the steadily growing inequity between urban 
and rural sectors.
The military coup of 196*4- has at least solved the 
authority crisis that beset the SUDENE, although it has 
done so in what might be described as an arbitrary and 
counter-developmental manner. In that one source of 
Furtado's political resistance in the Northeast emanated 
from a new entrepreneurial class, it might be said that 
part of that resistance to planned development has been 
hobbled.
One of the most important examples of limitation of 
pluralism under the regime is the relationship of in­
dustrial and commercial groups to the government. As 
analyzed by successful private sector figures who had
r
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occupied high bureaucratic offices during the 
Castelo Branco regime, the entrepreneurial class 
is subject to intimidation if not control by the 
government, particularly through control of credit 
and selective enforcement of regulations.^
The political change that effected a new perspec­
tive with regards to development in the Northeast Brazil 
during the 1950s and 1960s has been described widely as 
populism. Moderate alterations in the power structures 
of the region allowed for the entry of certain groups 
of people, most notably the landless peasants, into minor 
consideration by the new politicians. Some of the new 
governors, such as Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco, proceeded 
with plans to initiate widespread reforms in the political 
system. But the essential problem with populism in the 
Northeast was that it failed to establish either a the­
oretical framework, or an organizational infrastructure, 
through which political development could be rationalized 
and preserved. It was, instead, patterned along the lines 
of political pragmatism, a perspective familiar to 
Brazilians, and one which has "often,..saved the nation
from bloody revolutions, political violence, and military
84-fratricide ."
The spontaneous character of populism made the 
SUDENE's task of integration of regional political inter­
ests relatively impossible. Rich landowners refused to 
bargain with "castroite" peasants, and the two positions 
progressively polarized, inevitably preventing the SUDENE
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from initiating its rural programs. The military coup 
has allowed the traditional landowning elite of the North­
east to undermine substantive plans for political and so­
cio-economic change in the rural sector. Plans for region- 
wide political and socio-economic development have like­
wise been overcome by conflicting interests. At this 
juncture, the only solution for the problems of poverty 
and privation in the region appears to be the official 
recognition and rejection of the widespread condition 
of human poverty in Brazil*s rural interior.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE SUDENE AND THE ASSAULT OF 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE— 1961-1964
An Introduction to the Conflict and Outcome 
The Problems Involved, This chapter will concentrate on 
those elements of the development process in Northeast 
Brazil between 1961 and early 1964 that relate to the in­
fluence of the American foreign aid program in that region. 
The interaction between the SUDENE and the Alliance for 
Progress program, represented principally in the Northeast 
by the USAID mission, underscored the systematic proper­
ties of the two agencies for three reasonss first, the 
great disparity between the two conceptions of the role 
of the bureaucracy in Brazilian and American cultures.
Basic differences in the modi operand! of the SUDENE and 
the USAID require a broad-based' analysis which emphasizes 
the relation of functions to the overriding goals of the 
institution itself, and this strongly suggests a systems 
approach. Second, in that the goals of the two institu­
tions were significantly disparate, it becomes difficult 
at certain junctures to relate specific decisions. Again, 
a systems approach is able to emphasize both discrete and
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long-range objectives in a sociological and political 
context. Finally, a systems approach can afford another 
perspective with' which to examine the SUDENE in detail,
It should be emphasized that such an approach becomes 
sterile when it is abstracted from the political and 
economic setting of its object, and in this regard a 
strict adherence to systems analysis will not be pursued.
It was apparent to many observers of the U.S. de­
velopment effort after 1961 that, as it was then constitut­
ed, it was incapable of addressing itself to the exigen­
cies of positive change in the Northeast. The first and 
primary reason for this can be traced to the cultural in­
ability of American institutions, and specifically of 
foreign assistance agencies, to work constructively with 
Brazilian institutions. Two factors have contributed to 
this inability 1 first, since the values and goals of 
American institutions differ significantly from their 
Brazilian counterparts, a state of competition based 
upon relative differences often emerges during institu­
tional interaction. . Second, political conditions in the 
world in general, and in Latin America in particular, are 
such that United States foreign policy institutions have 
been reluctant to tolerate social and political upheaval 
that typically accompanies the "modernisation" process. 
Questions of security inevitably take precedence over the 
practical requirements of political development when this
process challenges U.S. foreign policy goals.
The inability of U.S. foreign assistance programs 
to deal effectively with the problems of development in 
Northeast Brazil relates to a larger questioni can a re­
gional approach to political and socioeconomic development 
in Northeast Brazil recognize and deal with the resistance 
to change evinced by regional political interests? It is 
the contention of this thesis that it cannot, and this is 
substantiated in two ways. First, a large number of re­
gional and supraregional planning and development agencies 
have been established in the Northeast since 1964. Neither 
these agencies nor the decimated SUDENE organization have 
been able to address the problems of poverty and privation, 
especially prevalent in the Northeastern rural sector and 
metropolitan shanty towns. Second, the USAID mission, 
which relied heavily on regional planning, ultimately 
failed to make an impact on the major problems of the re­
gion before its dissolution. The failure of regional 
planning in the Northeast has become, in the view of 
this observer, a well-demonstrated thesis,
Lincoln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil during 
the early 1960s and writer in the field of Latin American 
political development, became officially responsible for 
the Alliance for Progress program in Brazil during his 
tenure as ambassador. He underscored the importance of 
the program to the United States when he noted that "the
86
Brazilian Northeast is recognized by all concerned as 
one of the greatest challenges in Latin America to the 
declarations of policy set forth in the Charter of Punta 
del Este."1 The Charter established the Alliance for 
Progress, and enumerated the points and conditions with 
which the Latin American nations would be willing to co­
operate with the new United States development projects.
In may respects, it was the region of Northeast Brazil 
that prompted consideration by the new Kennedy admini­
stration of the Alliance program.
The structure of the Alliance for Progress effort 
in Northeast Brazil was not static. However, the bulk of 
the program was handled by the USAID mission to Recife, 
although this was technically subordinate to the U.S. 
consulate in Recife. In fact, a major rift had widened 
between the two agencies, principally because "the as­
sistance agency insisted that the consulate was unaware
2of the practical demands and problems facing the mission,"
The staff of the consulate, on the other hand, defensively
guarded its political priorities.
The consulate staff felt that USAID preoccupations 
with forcing through its immediate impact program 
was deleterious in the long-run to the regional po­
sition of the United States. The deterioration of 
relations between the SUDENE and USAID was becoming 
alarming.3
The officials of the consulate had perceptively noted that 
the USAID mission was effecting a two-year program that
87
closely corresponded to the SUDENE's "First Master 
Plan", thus establishing the probability of inter-agency 
competition. It was a condition that, in the eyes of the 
consulate officials, would heighten the need for inter­
agency cooperation.
Four central points emerge regarding the struc­
tures of the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the North­
east, and their interaction. First, the SUDENE was gener­
ally acknowledged by the Brazilian and American governments 
to be the primary agency responsible for political and 
socioeconomic development in the region between 1961 and 
1964. Second, the existence of the SUDENE during those 
years was of great psychological importance to many of 
the people of the region. Third, the U.S. foreign 
assistance activity in the Northeast during this period 
was similar in many respects to other development efforts 
in the region. Fourth, the need for cooperation between 
the SUDENE and the USAID mission, although recognized by 
both agencies as crucial to the development process, came 
to be ignored by both parties. A brief explanation of 
these points will help to illustrate the problem in a 
clearer perspective.
Although the SUDENE was not the only Brazilian 
agency actively engaged in development efforts in the 
Northeast in I96I, it was established expressly to co­
ordinate and direct the overall development process in
the Northeast. The DNOCS, for example, had been 
in operation in relatively the same form for eighty-some 
years, and although it purported to conduct a general 
program for the alleviation of poverty and privation in 
the Northeast, conditions had progressively worsened.
The emphasis of the DNOCS on the "hydraulic approach", 
the building of dams, wells, and resevoir irrigation 
systems, inadequately emphasized "physical facilities 
as a defense against an act of nature." The SUDENE 
was virtually the only program in the region which both 
recognized the social and political dimensions of the 
problems of poverty and privation, and was empowered to 
coordinate and direct other programs in an overall de­
velopment process.
The SUDENE was widely perceived to be a crucial 
step toward development of the region. Major popular 
demonstrations supported the strengthening of the First 
Master Plan, and national political coalitions supported 
its program. Part of this public support was based on 
the conception that the SUDENE would become a crucial 
instrument in transforming the stereotype of bureau­
cracy in the region. Nevertheless„ from its inception, 
the SUDENE itself conformed to some of the basic elements 
of the stereotype of Northeastern and Latin American 
Bureaucracies. From the first, young and inexperienced 
personnel were appointed to key positions; a pronounced
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esprit de corps soon emerged within the SUDENE funcio-
narios. Furthermore, a nexus of undefined and vague
institutional goals quickly engulfed the decision-making
process. Arpad von Lazar notes some other general
weaknesses typical of Latin American bureaucracies, and
to which the SUDENE eventually found itself subject.
The nature of Latin American bureaucracy makes the 
prescriptions of efficiency and performance into a 
difficult proposition. There is little respect for 
lower-level government officials; pay scales are low 
and many civil servants hold second jobs; recruitment 
is usually based on political connections and many 
bureaucracies are top-heavy and inflated with unneces­
sary personnel. To complicate mattersthere is a 
general shortage of trained officials. °
Although the SUDENE did not immediately evince these 
structural problems, except perhaps for the shortage of 
trained officials, it inevitably acquired many of them. 
Furthermore, the extent to which the SUDENE was compelled 
from the very beginning to proceed slowly and cautiously 
in the articulation and pursuit of specific goals resulted 
in an increasing decline in public expectations and sup­
port.
The U.S. development program in the Northeast 
was representative to some degree of the development pro­
grams in the region in two respects: first, it was rela­
tively broad in spectrum, and thereby tended to include 
all of the basic development program types; second, it 
emphasized the areas of public administration and pri­
vate investment, and therefore met the criteria required
\
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by the Brazilian government for regional development
programs. Lincoln Gordon, an important proponent of the
program, outlined its eight essential premises.
(1) establishment of mutually consistent targets in the 
main economic and social sectors; (2) assignment of 
priorities and estimation of costs and benefits of spe­
cific major projects; (3) measures to direct the public 
sector and to encourage private action in support of 
the program; (4) cost estimates for .the program in do­
mestic currency and foreign exchange; (5) a calcula­
tion of internal resources available for development; 
(6) analysis of the balance of payments and of the 
necessary external financing; (7) the basic fiscal and 
monetary policies required to fulfill the program 
within a framework of price stability; and (8; the 
machinery of public administration, including mea­
sures for the cooperation of private organizations, 
to make the program effective.7
Although these points applied to the entire hemispheric
Alliance for Progress program, they were very much in
evidence in the Northeast, Moreover, latent within
these goals was the assumption that the Alliance machinery,
represented in the Northeast mainly by the USAID mission,
would direct all of the regional development efforts, and
serve as a spokesman for all foreign assistance projects.
Independent foreign assistance programs in 1961 included
technical and scholarship missions from and to France,
technical assistance programs in irrigation, textiles, and
well-digging from Israel, Japan, and Hungary, and loans to
the oil development agency(PETROBRAS) from Italy.® All
of these programs lent themselves to the sort of general
management and coordination that had been advocated by
both the SUDENE and the Alliance for Progress.
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Given the character of the broad-based programs 
of political and socioeconomic development planned by both 
the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the Northeast, cooper­
ation between the two became a foregone conclusion. When, 
in fact, it became apparent that the two institutions were 
incapable, for a variety of reasons, of the intensive co­
ordination and cooperation that regional problems required, 
it was the SUDENE which immediately suffered an impairment 
in its vital functions. The reason for this is based on 
the relative institutional structures and goals, and the 
degree to which regional cooperation constituted the vital 
constituent in the SUDENE's capabilities,
A Systems Analysis of the Problem. An analysis of the 
ways in which the USAID mission to Northeast Brazil hin­
dered the function of the principal indigenous develop­
ment agency in that region, the SUDENE, stresses the 
kinds of arguments that the American development officials 
might be willing to concede. It is, in fact, important 
to do this for several reasons. In the first place, 
the problems of the region are so complex and intense that 
they provide an "easy" and convenient rationale for the 
failure of the American program to effect significant 
change in the region. Second, the extreme polarization 
of Latin American politics often obscures the under­
standing of events and consequent results. By adopting
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the perspective of systems analysis, this writer hopes 
to present, in a form that would be acceptable to the 
key protagonists in the U.S. foreign assistance program 
in Northeast Brazil between 1961 and 1964, a cogent ex­
planation of their failure to fulfill program goals.
Apter, in The Politics of Modernization, suggests 
an approach to the resolution of the problems of politi­
cal development in terms that suggest the case of North­
east Brazil. He relates political factors to an economic 
process which he defines as the transition from moderni­
zation to industrialization.
Countries approaching the point of change from modern­
ization to industrialization include Argentina, Chile, 
Brazil, and Venezuela. Paradoxically, as the transi­
tion occurs, political factors become more rather than 
less pronounced. Governments are less stable and 
quite often more autocratic. Choices are uncertain, 
and the uncertainty leads to non-rational acts of de­cision-making. 9
Moreover, a significant increase in the degree of autocra­
cy in Brazilian government since the 1940s suggests the 
growing presence of what Apter refers to as the "moderniz­
ing elite". He postulates three basic functions for this 
elite* first, the goal specification function, by which 
is meant "the organization of resources around a defined 
set of objects;" second, the institutional coherence func­
tion, which means "the linkage of diverse roles into a 
community;" and third, the central control function, which 
"involves the mechanism of coercion in a s o c i e t y . T h e
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second function, institutional coherence, strongly sug­
gests the role that the SUDENE tried to fill between 1961 
and 1964; similarly, it was. this role that the USAID 
mission to the Northeast adopted, to the detriment of the 
SUDENE.
Samuel P. Huntington approximates Apter*s defini­
tion of the institutional coherence function when he notes 
that "the degree of community in a complex society thus,
in a rough sense, depends upon the strength and scope of
11its political institutions." Huntington explains insti­
tutionalization in the following terms.
Institutionalization is the process by which organi­
zations and procedures acquire value and stability.
The level of institutionalization of any political 
system can be defined by the adaptability, complex­
ity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations 
and procedures. So also, the level of institution­
alization of any particular organization or procedure 
can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, au­
tonomy and coherence. If these criteria can be iden­
tified and measured, political systems can be com­
pared in terms of their levels of institutionaliza­
tion. 2
This four-point analysis is useful in analyzing the de­
gree to which Brazilian institutions can be said to have 
developed politically. Huntington emphasizes the way in 
which autonomy and coherence are interdependent by stres­
sing that "autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling 
the organization to develop an esprit and style that be­
come distinctive marks of its behavior." He notes that 
autonomy lessens the vulnerability of institutions to ex­
96
ternal forces, but cannot ultimately protect them against 
internal changes, "Rapid or substantial expansions in 
the membership of an organization or in the participants 
in a system tend to weaken coherence, Autonomy be­
comes insufficient as a guarantee of coherence of an in­
stitution when internal stresses become manifest.
As Apter has observed, Brazil is an instance of a 
nation undergoing the transformation from “modernizing" 
to industrializing society. In 1961, when both the Al­
liance for Progress and the SUDENE were initiated, Brazil 
had already established certain patterns in its develop­
ment process which deeply affected the Northeast. One 
of these patterns was that of regional inequities. The
South continued to rapidly outpace the rest of the nation
14in economic development and technological advancement.
This had the effect of weakening the coherence of insti­
tutions in the Northeast in that they depended on an ex­
ternal coalition with interests in the South for their 
autonomy. Other elements have likewise tended to rigidi- 
fy and weaken the coherence of Brazilian institutions.
New groups have been brought into the political arena 
diversifying and expanding the electorate. Urban in­
dustrial, commercial, and financial elements have 
largely won national political control from the con­
servative landowners(who, however, still dominate the 
internal politics of many states, particularly in the 
North and the interior), A rapidly growing urban mid­
dle class is gaining in strength through its capacity 
for political leadership, its importance in the bur­
geoning bureaucracy, and its dominant position in the 
communications m e d i a .  6
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One of the groups that brings into focus Apter*s 
reference to the institutional coherence function is the 
bureaucracy. The Brazilian bureaucracy inevitably becomes 
responsible for engineering the practical details of de­
velopment programs such as the SUDENE. The Brazilian 
bureaucracy, like other Latin American bureaucracies, tends 
also to articulate the goals and self-interests of its 
members, and this can cloud and diminish the accomplish­
ments of institutions. At times, members of the bureau­
cracy act as highly potent political groups.
The great numbers within Brazil#s public bureaucracy 
function as a sophisticated, literate, politicized, 
and eloquent minority in a country where political 
apathy is not unknown. They know well what they want 
and are able to^communicate these wants to the de­
cision makers. °
Other general tendencies that impaired the coherence of ' 
Brazilian institutions during this period existed. Popu­
lar participation in the political system was rapidly ex­
panding by 1961, and according to Ronald Schneider, "new 
groups have been brought into the political arena, diver­
sifying and expanding the e l e c t o r a t e . T h e s e  groups in­
cluded the urban industrial, commercial, and financial 
18interests, and provided what Huntington has labelled 
the "rapid or substantial expansion" in the membership 
of various critical institutions. Following his analysis, 
this condition can be said to have made it imperative that 
factors relating to institutional vulnerability be con-
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sidered as an integral part of development programs.
Institutional vulnerability can be described as 
one way in which institutions become deficient in their 
ability to achieve goals, or to function. Both Hunting­
ton and Apter have stressed the need for modernizing author­
itarian structures, but they also insist on the need for 
simultaneous political development, especially with re­
gards to the growth of effective institutions. Apter 
explains this position:
Indeed, modernization emphasizes certain types of 
authority. The particular combinations of right 
that, embodied in authority, we call legitimacy are 
quite often determined by the goals of the polity. 
Failure to achieve such goals is thus prejudicial to 
authority. This means that in many modernizing so­
cieties the polity can only be secured by its suc­
cesses. The efficiency of a regime determines the 
quality of its authority.19
While it is not difficult to disagree with this equation
of efficiency and "quality" authority, the basic point
remains. Modernizing institutions are undermined if
their principal goals are corrupted or destroyed because,
to paraphrase Apter*s remarks, authority depends to a 1
great degree on its ability to effect successes in the
struggle for development. Moreover, Huntington observes
that institutions which have become vulnerable to the
sorts of internal changes mentioned earlier, pressures
which the Brazilian institutions were especially subject
to by 1961, are excessively vulnerable to "outside"
pressures. In this light, programs like the Alliance
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for Progress can exercise considerable influence on 
indigenous institutions.
Huntington also underscores the need.in moderniz­
ing institutions for "unity, esprit, morale, and disci­
pline... in governments as well as in regiments." Noting 
that there is a need for political development concurrent 
with social and economic development, he adds that "the 
problems of creating coherent political organizations are 
more difficult but not fundamentally different from those
involved in the creation of coherent military organiza- 
21tions." Although Huntington’s emphasis on military 
efficiency in the development process is undesirable in 
terms of long-range political development, and his model 
of "praetorian democracy" and "praetorian modernizing re­
gimes" is probably counterproductive— again, in the long- 
run— his point does have some merit in the context of the 
breakdown of efficiency of the SUDENE after 1961. The 
Brazilian gbverjnment, while not entirely lacking in the 
expertise that Huntington deems so necessary in institu­
tion-building, was victimized in the Northeast by foreign 
intervention in the functions of a basic development 
agency, the SUDENE.
In its effort to achieve sincere but inappropriate 
foreign policy objectives, the United States inter­
vened in the internal politics of the Northeast at 
a critical juncture: as the battle between the tra­
ditional elites and the reformers commenced. Burden­
ed with the political necessity of demonstrating its
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competence within the Alliance for Progress frame­
work, the USAID mission perceived a conflict between 
its needs and the goals of the regional reform move­
ment. Capitalizing on the natural dissatisfaction of 
some elements of that movement, the United States 
undercut the SUDENE.22
Roett has concluded that the USAID, in developing its own 
program, "could only reconcile its objectives with region­
al development by condemning Furtado and the superinten­
dency as divisive and, ultimately, as cohorts of the radi- ■ 
cal nationalism that permeated and, ultimately, destroyed 
the constitutional system."2-̂ Under the aegis of an "al­
liance" the USAID mission to the Northeast seriously 
weakened the only agency in the Northeast capable of co­
ordinating the regional development process, and at a time 
when that agency was especially vulnerable to outside in­
fluence.
Huntington continually emphasizes the importance 
of organizational adaptability. His point is that or­
ganizations like the SUDENE are created to perform types 
of activities which can be described as related functions, 
or even a single function. "When that function is no long­
er needed, the organization faces a major crisisi it 
either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a 
lingering death." The machinery of the SUDENE, in other 
words, could not be expected to remain intact for very 
long after its primary function, coordination of the 
development of the Northeast, had been usurped.
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Another of Huntington's points that relates 
closely to the situation of the SUDENE between 1961 and 
196A concerns development levels. He notes that high­
er levels of institutionalization result in the greater 
ability of institutions to adapt to change.2"* The 
SUDENE organization was an attempt at creating a high 
level institution in a region where the resources, ex­
pertise and culture were insufficient. Although it
has been described as a "radical innovation", and "admin-
26istratively autonomous", it could be relatively easily 
outmaneuvered by the USAID mission. The latter organi­
zation was capable of constantly adapting to new con­
ditions, whereas the SUDENE experienced some difficulty 
in altering its program after a Master Plan had been ap­
proved.
It is perhaps ironic that although the SUDENE was 
not able to adapt easily to the political changes taking 
place in the Northeast, its program of political "modern­
ization" of the Northeast utilized adaptability as a 
standard of viability.
The superintendency did not set out to destroy all 
that was old, but the essential issue was that of 
adaptability: if old structures were unwilling or
unable to demonstrate vigor and innovativeness, they 
were to be removed. The emphasis on immediate demon­
strations of success was directly related to the 
double problem of culture and structure: for the
new structures to gain acceptance in the Northeast, 
success was required; and for the needed change in 
the political culture to take place, the new struc­
tures required acceptance. '
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The tendency for traditional institutions to resist 
innovation and adaptability became a useful tool in 
the USAID campaign against the SUDENE. It was further 
reflected after 1964-, when "the SUDENE was emasculated„ 
and the foreign policy of the United States was re­
garded by some of the analysts as the decisive factor in 
the failure of the superintendency to make a significant 
contribution to the modernization of the Northeast.”^®
The ideas of both Huntington and Apter with 
regards to general characteristics of "modernization" 
are incomplete, especially with regards to Northeast 
Brazil. Although they do provide the basis for arguments 
that this writer feels would be convincing even to the 
officials of the USAID mission in Northeast Brazil, they 
are very general in content0 Ronald Schneider, for ex­
ample, noted that active political parties in developing 
nations are taken for granted by the two authors, and 
"the function that (Jheyl postulate for parties is beyond
29that which they have ever effectively fulfilled in Brazil.*5 
Another work which deals with the problems of political 
and economic development, and which has some currency 
among social scientists and development analysts, is 
Comparative Politicst A Developmental Approach, by 
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell. As with Hunting­
ton and Apter, the ideas expressed by Almond and Powell 
are repugnant to people who are convinced that centralized
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authority is not necessarily the key to political de­
velopment. Nevertheless, this kind of analysis has played 
an important role in U.S. foreign policy, and should 
therefore be utilized.
Almond and Powell refer specifically to the Bra­
zilian government in their categorization of authoritarian 
systems, citing it as an example of "modernizing author­
itarian" government.-^ Moreover, they define political 
systems as relating directly to coercion, especially at 
the stage in which political development is rapidly taking 
place. This general statement is qualified, however.
We are not, then, saying that the political system is 
concerned solely with force, violence, or compulsion; 
rather, that its relation to coercion is its distinc­
tive quality. Political elites are usually concerned 
with goals such as national expansion or security, so­
cial welfare, the aggrandizement of their power over 
other groups, increased popular participation in pol­
itics, and the like; but their concern with these val­
ues as politicians is related to compulsory actions 
such as law-making and law enforcement, foreign and 
defense policy, and taxation. The political system is 
not the only system that makes rules and enforces them, 
but its rules and enforcements go all the way to com­
pelling obedience or p e r f o r m a n c e , 3 1
By creating a model of "modernizing authoritarian" regimes
that does not rest on active political parties, these
authors provide generalities which might be applied more
directly to Brazil.
A major problem in defining the sort of political 
development that would be consonant with "modernization" 
in Northeast Brazil depends in large measure on a defini­
1G#
tion of that concept. Apter notes that there are problems 
in defining "modernization" simultaneously for industrial­
izing and rural societies, and he adds that*
Modernization may be described in non-industrial so­
cieties as the transposition of certain roles— pro­
fessional, technical, administrative— -and the trans­
position of institutions supporting these roles-—  
hospitals, schools, universities, buteaucracies. 
Non-industrial modernizing societies, however, lack 
the powerful integrating thrust found in industrial 
societies. Social organizations are more chaotic and 
confused. Politics becomes the mechanism of integra­
tion, and authority is the critical problem confront­
ing leader s.
In considering the Brazilian Northeast, special care is 
required in distinguishing between the Brazilian political 
and economic milieu, representative of an industrializing 
society, and that of the Northeast, basically a non-indus­
trial society. The two, of course, are by no means dis­
tinct, and many generalizations regarding Brazil in general 
are also valid for the Northeast. Moreover, Guy Hunter's 
observation that the "strategy of rural development" is 
a critical component of "the total strategy by which the 
political aims of the society are to be achieved,"^ 
further integrates the example of Brazil and its Northeast.
A relation of structural functionalism to politi­
cal development is the primary thesis of Almond and Rowell, 
and it remains close in form to the description of rural- 
based political development discussed by Apter. Almond 
and Powell define the political system as including "all
35structures in their political aspects, a somewhat dif-
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ficult definition to unravel. Nevertheless, there is 
some indication of the meaning of the word "political" 
in the definition of political functions, which include 
three major categories? capabilities, conversion proces­
ses, and system maintenance and adaptation functions. 
Capabilities include regulative, extractive, distribu­
tive, and responsive functions. System maintenance and 
adaptation functions include the socialization and recruit­
ment of people. The category "conversion processes" 
offers an important insight into the kinds of arguments 
concerning political activity in Northeast Brazil to 
which the USAID functionaries might be most receptive; 
it likewise underscores the ambiguity of their task there.
Conversion processes are defined by Almond and
Powell as "the ways systems transform inputs into outputs.
In the political system this involves the ways in which
demands and supports are transformed into authoritative
decisions and are implemented."-^ These processes are
divided into six specific functions, or?
the ways in which (1) demands are formulated(interest 
articulation); (2) demands are combined in the form of 
alternative courses of action( interest aggregation);
(3) authoritative rules are formulated(rule making);
(4) these rules are applied and enforced(rule appli­
cation); (5) these applications of rules are adjudi­
cated in individual cases(rule adjudication); and (6) 
these various activities are communicated both within 
the political system, and between the political system 
and its environment(communication),37
Although these specific functions generally interrelate
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with "capabilities" and "system maintenance and adap­
tation" functions, they might be said to particularly 
apply to the case of Northeast Brazil in that they sug­
gest reasons for the failure of the USAID mission to that 
region, and its related inability to recognize the gen­
eral characteristics and requisites of constructive poli­
tical change there.
Functional analysis may provide an important per­
spective for examining the political conditions of the 
Northeast between 1961 and 1964, not only because it 
rationalizes possible choices of action available to 
USAID officials, but also because institutions consti­
tuted the central theme of development in that setting. 
Apter has summarized what he considers to be the primary 
value of the functional approach.
The value of functional analysis in general, then, 
is that it helps us to understand the purposes and 
meanings of actions. Cognitive mapping is the task 
that it undertakes. The viability approach merely 
sharpens the focus, restricting the analysis of pur­
pose to the survival of the unit and a set of mean­
ings based on that purpose. This helps us to under­
stand the properties and widely differing activities 
of certain systems and leads to the exploration of 
different levels of meaning, latent and manifest, 
cognitive and emotive. In this sense functionalism 
relies first on semantic empiricism and only second 
on operational empiricism: that is, it is pragmatic before it is operational.38
Functional analysis, in this perspective, might have been
a pragmatic tool available to the USAID officials, one
that could ostensibly have been used to establish posi-
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tive and negative criteria for use in the development 
process. In the case of the Northeast, the failure of 
the USAID mission to effect positive change in the re­
gion can be assessed in terras of the extent to which it 
hindered the function of an institution(the SUDENE) whose 
goals it supposedly embraced, based on the Charter of 
Punta del Este.
Interest articulation is the most applicable of
the conversion processes to the effect which the USAID
had upon the function of the SUDENE. Almond and Powell
note that "in societies where a small elite makes all the
political decisions, where the articulation takes place
from person to person or within a small group, it is a
powerful factor in explaining the course of political 
3 0decisions." Such was the case in Northeast Brazil. 
Furthermore, the two authors observe that "such inter­
est articulation has been a common feature, for example, 
in the history of strongman dictatorships," The ten­
dency of Brazilian bureaucracies to evince personalized 
leadership patterns, or personalismo, relates closely to 
this comment.
In describing this function, Almond and Powell
make an important distinction.
The articulation of interests may be instrumental or 
affective. An affective articulation takes the form 
Of a simple expression of gratitude, anger, disappoint 
ment, or hope. An instrumental articulation takes the 
form of a bargain with the consequences realistical-
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ly spelled out. The instrumental style is common 
in American politics# where associational interest 
groups often threaten to make their future financial 
or voting support directly contingent upon a legis­
lator’s support of a certain bill,^.
The Brazilian expression of interest articulation# in mark­
ed contrast with the American expression, is typically 
affective. The inevitable conflict between these two 
forms in the absence of recognition of this distinction 
is exemplified by the relationship between the SUDENE and 
the USAID after 1961.
SUDENE efforts at political change were difficult for 
the staff of the USAID mission to understand. Gradu­
ally those efforts were seen as part of a premeditat­
ed policy to sabbotage the USAID program itself. A 
concept such as political development# or political 
modernization, had little meaning in the scheme of 
obligating funds, signing project agreements, and de­
feating the security threat posed by communist sub­
version. The constraint of organizational demand for 
performance and success in the Northeast resulted, 
ultimately, in the neglect and resentment of what the 
SUDENE was attempting to achieve. As the USAID pro­
gram became an end in and of itself, little room re­
mained for the original objectives of Brazilian re­gional development .̂ "2
The USAID mission eventually made their support of the 
SUDENE program contingent upon specific positions, such 
as a firm stand against communism, a stand which had lit­
tle value or relation to the tasks before the new agency. 
Both institutions were articulating their interests# but 
the manner in which the USAID mission accomplished this 
function was strongly instrumental— specific and narrowly 
defined goals pursued through strict bargaining. The ar­
ticulation of interest by the SUDENE was, on the other
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hand, affective— simple expressions of hope were chief 
motivating factors in the minds of lower eschelon func­
tionaries, and goals were very generally defined and 
"hopeful" in essence.
Another dimension of the contrasting expressions 
of interest articulation experienced in the relationship 
between the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the Northeast 
is suggested, in generalized terms of Latin America, by 
Kenneth F. Johnson in an article that appeared in The Wes­
tern Political Quarterly. He observed that "because a 
genuinely competitive and collaborative spirit is lack­
ing, Latin Americans are suspicious of impersonal insti- 
tutions which control and allocate capital." ^ According 
to Johnson, the social pluralism that accompanies this 
attitude has a moderating effect on political behavior,
tending to limit "excesses" such as organized radical
44political activity. The fears of the USAID staff
that the SUDENE programs were essentially communistic,
and therefore threatening, were culturally unfounded.
In fact, the SUDENE was functioning roughly according
to general Latin American standards.
Because of the relative lack of social plurialism in 
Latin America, performance entities become psychologi­
cally compartmentalized and politically semi-autono- 
mous. Vocational roles tend to circumscribe social 
attitudes and political attachments. Armies, bureau­
cracies, legislatures, are found each with its own 
highly subjective elan vital, an aggressive expansion­
ist force marked by the all-consuming lust for control 
and easily infused with a moral purpose to justify
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the intrusion upon other r o l e s .
In this sense, representatives of an instrumentalist soci­
ety, the United States, effectively utilized bargaining 
and boycott to suppress the functional assertiveness of 
the SUDENE, and thereby modified and substantially weaken­
ed its natural pattern of interest articulation.
Almond and Powell define interest aggregation as 
"the function of converting demands into general policy 
alternatives."^ Both differentiation between, and func­
tional specialization of, specific political structures 
are included in this category. The authors observe that 
in authoritarian regimes(as are personalized bureaucracies) 
"aspirations often outstrip capabilities in the initiation
of modernization, and a nearly intolerable burden is quite
hr?commonly placed upon the aggregative function." This 
comment is relevant with respect to the SUDENE. The 
institution had been saddled from its inception with de­
mands that could not easily be fulfilled in the short- 
run. The Governor of Pernambuco, Miguel Arraes, had 
campaigned on the "He Ninguem" platform, which implied 
that the SUDENE would play a large role in elevating the 
landless peasants to a position of utility, security and 
importance. The officials of the USAID mission, in 
contrast, dealt with "interest aggregation" in terms 
of clearly defined goals which tended to be expressed 
in concise economic terms.
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In 1963 Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, the embodiment 
of cultivated rationality, met with Arraes in the 
governor's palace. Gordon tried to explain how the 
uncontrolled wage increases in the sugar zone were 
contributing to the Brazilian inflation. Arraes 
failed completely to grasp these macro-economic re­
lationships, but he did .understand that, in the 
sertao and the sugar zone, to elevate Joe Nobody 
into a somebody was to make a revolution in Brazil. 
Gordon(and the U.S. development economists in 
charge of the AID program) had no more affinity 
with that revolution than_Arraes had with Gordon's 
sophisticated economics.^®
Constructive cooperation in this situation was a diffi­
cult proposition, but was nevertheless the only way in 
which the official goals of the Alliance for Progress, 
as agreed upon by Brazil and the United States, could be 
fulfilled. But in spite of this, "once the United States 
recognized that the social change taking place in North-r 
eastern Brazil was inherently disorderly and even poten­
tially revolutionary, it backed off and shifted its con­
centration to the core society, hoping that by gradual
9expansion the core would eventually take in the marginals.*' 
Interest aggregation can also be observed in 
institutions as an indicator of the ways in which changes 
occur. The perspective of the USAID mission to the 
Northeast, for example, differed significantly from that 
of the SUDENE in this regard. The USAID officials 
quickly became hostile and distrustful toward what they 
perceived as acts of irrational interest aggregation.
After the SUDENE was significantly altered in 1964, par­
ticularly in its expression of interest aggregation in
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a cultural sense, it consequently lost its ability 
to effect political and socioeconomic change to any 
significant degree.
The rule-making and rule adjudication functions 
add further detail to the relationship between the two 
institutions. Almond and Powell classify these two cate­
gories as the "governmental functions"^® and note that 
"rule making in traditional and primitive political sys­
tems tends to be either a charismatic process or a slow, 
incremental process of accumulation of tradition, which 
is in part a derivative of the day-to-day rule enforce­
ments and rule adjudications of the systems."^ While 
much of the rule-making power relative to political de­
cisions in the Northeast was out of the control of the 
SUDENE's leadership, there were decisive elements of 
practical application that required just the sort of 
"charismatic process" that Almond and Powell refer to. 
Furthermore, the degree to which the SUDENE could engage 
in the rule-making process in its immediate environment 
was directly related to its own internal rule-making 
process, which was tied to new standards and ideas, new 
precedents, tempered by the culture and traditional 
standards of bureaucratic behavior.
The rule-making function can be related to the 
activities of the USAID officials in several ways. Al­
though not directly involved with the promulgation of the
\
treaty that established the Alliance for Progress, they 
had a relatively free hand in applying general standards 
of procedure in specific instances. They likewise tended 
to establish rules of acceptable action for the'institu­
tions with which they cooperated. The recommendations 
of the Charter of Punta del Este— which included bi­
lateral agreements to substantially alter archaic land- 
tenure practices— constituted both prescriptions and 
strictures of behavior that were significant. Although 
Brazilian representatives had agreed in principle to the 
articles of the Charter, there is no evidence to sug­
gest that the officials of the institutions of the 
Northeast accepted, or even adequately understood, the 
complex development rules that were implied therein. 
Moreover, the degree to which the USAID officials sought 
to take up leadership and responsibility in initiating the 
reforms of the Charter emphasized their active subversion
of the rule-making function of the SUDENE by these ex-
/ternal agents of development. Levinson and Onis, in 
their book The Alliance That Lost Its Way, note that 
"external assistance, whether capital or technical, is 
important, but it cannot substitute for Latin American 
leadership in dealing with such issues as population 
policy, agrarian reform, and urban development."^2
Both the SUDENE and the USAID mission engaged in 
what can be described as the rule-making function, al-
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though the USAID mission only had access to sanction— the 
ability to withhold vitally-needed assistance. This be­
came especially apparent after the USAID mission became 
openly disenchanted with the policies of Furtado and the 
SUDENE.
When the United States assistance agency found that 
its Brazilian partner did.not share its enthusiasm 
for using the Northeast to accomplish United States 
political goals, the USAID sought allies among other 
regional groups. In so doing, the United States pro­
vided a counterweight to the SUDENE. The USAID 
threatened to weaken the Brazilian agency's position 
as co-ordinator of economic development and primary 
architect of the attack on the political patriarchal- 
ism that continued to flourish in the area. The con­
sensus created by the SUDENE for pursuing economic 
growth and encouraging graduated political differ­
entiation, while the national political system was 
manifesting signs of disintegration, was undermined. 
Political groups in the Northeast saw a convenient 
opportunity to gain economic support for pet projects 
in exchange for expousal of United States political goals.53
Political considerations which did not necessarily re­
flect the goals and purposes of the Alliance for Progress 
as specified in the Charter of Punta del Este were carried 
out with increasing effect, demonstrating both the rule- 
making impotence of the SUDENE, and the power of the Al­
liance to undermine political development in the region.
The rule application function has a direct 
bearing on the breakdown of the relationship between the 
SUDENE and the USAID mission in the Northeast. Almond 
and Powell have observed that "as a political system ex­
pands in size, or faces an increasingly complex environ-
U 5
ment or a widening range of tasks, the pressures to 
develop specialized rule-application structures are inex-
54orable." The authors further note that "it becomes im­
perative that the system develop capabilities to meet new 
goals or pressures* effective rule application is a neces­
sary prerequisite to such development.""^ The SUDENE was 
created specifically to serve the rule application func­
tion in the Northeast, and undermining the effective func­
tion of the SUDENE likewise represented a significant 
weakening of rule application in the development process, 
Levinson and Onis have suggested that a major area 
of importance in the Alliance, one that Almond and Powell 
would argue is important to all of the conversion proces­
ses, was educational reform. In Northeast Brazil, a 
complex adult education program was immediately establish­
ed after i960 under the aegis of the USAID mission and the 
SUDENE. In 1963 and 1964 about four thousand people were
enrolled in this pilot program in the two states of Rio
56Grande do Norte and Alag^as. The USAID mission, which 
was headquartered in Recife, became dissatisfied with the 
political content of the program in January of 1964, and 
terminated all United States support* According to Lev­
inson and Onils, "this act was merely one manifestation
of an insistence on rationality and order in a situation
57of revolutionary change,"^ As it became increasingly 
clear in the Northeast that social, ■< political, and econ-
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omic change were implicitly interrelated, the USAID 
officials began to hesitate in upholding all of the 
provisions of the Alliance, While their purpose in Bra­
zil was to aid in the multi-faceted process of political 
and economic development, their daily activities came 
to involve just the opposite— the suppression of the 
disorderly development process. Termination of the 
United States support of the education program, in this 
milieu, became inevitable•
The Paulo Freire [education] program was indeed sub­
versive in its basic technique of deliberate provoca­
tion and in its purpose of developing a critical fac­
ulty, creating a sense of the capacity and moral re­
sponsibility of the individual to change his life and 
the world around him. In a hierarchical, paternalist­
ic society where the coronel's word was law, this em­
phasis upon critical thinking and individual and com­
munity action was destructive of traditional values.
The Freire program was revolutionary in the most 
profound sense of the term,
Moreover, the program obviously did not conform to the
prerequisites of lasting political "security", especially
from the context of U.S. foreign policy.
The problem of education reform in the Northeast 
provides an explicit example of how the USAID mission chose 
to suppress development in the name of national and inter­
national security. In 1962, "adaraent opposition to a 
school-construction program came from the education di­
vision of the QJ.S3 embassy, which argued that the prob­
lem of education in the Northeast was curricular and that 
teacher training was essential."^ Indeed, the superin-
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tendent of the SUDENE, Celso Furtado, focused attention
on this problem and urged that "SUDENE must first create
a new mentality among university students."^0 However,
cooperation between the SUDENE and the USAID staffs in the
creation of a new curricular base soon became impossible,
and "security" considerations received the attention of
U.S. policy makers.
Discussions in Cthe U.S. embassy in] Rio de Janeiro 
moved away from the comprehensive program planning. 
Protests by the education division and other USAID 
members were overcome by the political staff of the 
embassy? anything that economic assistance might do 
to combat communist influence in the Northeast must 
subordinate purely economic development goalsj the 
Peasant League agitation and the steady increment of 
leftist, nationalist sentiment in urban areas re­
quired immediate attention? the school ^building] 
program would serve as access into the region,
Difficulties in defining the communication func­
tion are explained by Almond and Powell as related to its 
pervasive and all-encompassing character. They focus, for 
the purpose of definition, on "the most general and sig-
62nificant flows of informationm the political systems."
In a description that might be strongly related to the
relationship between the SUDENE and the USAID mission to
the Northeast, Almond and Powell observe that*
The formal structures in a political system, constitute 
a particularly important channel of information. The 
governmental structures, particularly the bureaucracy, 
make it possible for the political leaders to communi­
cate directions for rule implementation to various po­
litical office-holders in an efficient and unambiguous 
fashion. The lifeline of communication holds the en­
tire governmental structure together and makes pos­
sible coordinated implementation of laws and the mo­
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bilization of societal resources.
In another observation that can be said to relate to the 
breakdown of the relationship between the SUDENE and the 
USAID mission to the Northeast, Almond and Powell add that 
"social mobilization is in large part a communications 
phenomenon. Urbanization, literacy, secularization of 
traditional ties and beliefs, employment in a wage economy, 
and other concomitants of mobilization are inextricably 
involved with exposure to new structures and processes of 
communication." Communication, then, is vital to pro­
cesses of change, and to the adaptation of institutions 
and newly formed authority positions to the political mi­
lieu.
The wide disparity between the expression, or com­
munication, patterns of American and Brazilian institutions 
was an important element in the decisions that led to 
redirection of American foreign aid to the Northeast.
The SUDENE was subjected to a barrage of technical requi­
sites as the USAID mission began to suspect that U.S. 
foreign aid might be violating its own “national interests'*. 
Furthermore, the widening political battle of the SUDENE 
in the Northeast meant that increasing amounts of infor­
mation were becoming necessary as justification for pro­
gram implementation. Again, with regards to this type of 
problem, Almond and Powell remark that "as a consequence 
of high volumes of information, and of the technical na­
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ture of much information, a very large and complex system 
is pushed inescapably either towards a degree of decentral-
. . . . 65ization, or towards inefficient and non-rational actions." 
Both the SUDENE and, perhaps more important, the federal 
• government in Brasilia were experiencing a massive increase 
in information requisites. The basis of the SUDENE’s pro­
gram was its political support from the federal govern­
ment, since its primary purpose in the Northeast was to 
overthrow the traditional power structure.^ The general­
ized methodology by which the USAID "disqualified" the 
SUDENE from the aid program was especially pernicious to 
that organization.
It is ironic that the USAID fear of Peasant League
agitation, and of the SUDENE's apparent non-concern with
regards to the situation, was not shared by the group in
the Northeast with the most stake in the status quo.
The Brazilian deputy Francisco Juli&o, head of the 
Peasant Leagues of the Northeast, who had recently 
proclaimed himself a Castroite, seemed to be ter­
rifying all the newspaper* readers in the United 
States. But he did not frighten the Brazilian oli­
garchs in the least, as is shown by the fact that 
they made no move whatsoever toward agrarian reform.
The oligarchs knew something the American newspaper 
correspondents did not knows that the Juiiao 
family were fazendeiros (great landowners), and that 
all his political rhetoric was only that— rhetoric.6?
Whether or not Juiiao's association with a landowning
family discounted his ability to become a revolutionary,
it is important to note that the USAID officials were
not sensitive to real indications of political change.
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They were not, in fact, sensitive to the most effective 
means to prevent the undesired change. As Roett noted,
"in this instance, the SUDENE, not the United States 
foreign assistance and its impact programs, was the more
appropriate means of robbing Juiiao of his potential fol-
68lowing,"
Another manifestation of the critical breakdown 
of communication, in this instance in the internal de­
cision-making process of the U.S. foreign assistance 
effort, resulted from a disparity between high-level 
American goals, and those proposed from the field.
It appears that the emphasis shifted or became more 
fluid in the USAID and the White House. While the 
survey team report was, in theory, an exemplary mod­
el for foreign assistance, it did not meet the rap­
idly changing United States security interests in 
the Northeast. The program discussed in Brazil, and 
which Furtado still assumed to be the position of the 
United States, had been downgraded to meet the policy 
need of a dramatic political impact in the Northeast. 
While the survey team report would remain a part of 
the subsequent policy determination, it would not be 
what Furtado and the survey team had mutually under­
stood it to be. *
An initial agreement on the conditions for assistance was
progressively rendered meaningless, and the inability of
the SUDENE officials to grasp the significance of this
change became a critical factor in the agency's function.
It was not necessarily the ineffectiveness of the 
SUDENE which was responsible for this dysfunction in com­
munication, however. The officials of the USAID mission 
were contradicting their goals in the Northeast by stres-
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sing high impact programs at the expense of long-range 
political, social, and economic development. By acting 
covertly and independently, they were inexplicably(at 
least from the standpoint of rational explanation) ig­
noring their purpose in the region.
While the work by Almond and Powell could not have 
figured in the U.S. decision-making process as early as 
1963, it nevertheless expresses the non-ideological and 
social science explanation that can be assumed to have 
the most appeal to government bureaucrats. There are 
numerous ideological and moral arguments that would 
condemn the actions of the U.S. foreign assistance pro­
gram in the Northeast between I96I and 1963. The criti­
cal fact is that even from a conventional administrative 
standpoint, the officials of the USAID mission to the 
Northeast were functioning on weak premises.
The Assault of Foreign Aid in Retrospect. The failure of 
the Alliance for Progress to substantially change the con­
ditions of poverty and privation in Northeast Brazil stems 
in large measure from the severity of those problems. 
However, perhaps an even greater obstacle to success was 
the central fallacy around which the Alliance was construc­
ted * that political stability would accompany social and 
economic development. Huntington has referred specifical­
ly to this inconsistency in the program.
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With the Alliance for Progress in 1961, social reform—  
that is, the more'equitable distribution of material 
and symbolic resources— joined economic development as 
a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward 
modernizing countries. ..... .
...the relationship between social reform and politi­
cal stability resembles that between economic develop­
ment and political stability. In some circumstances 
reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful 
rather than violent change. In other circumstances, 
however, reform may well exacerbate tensions, precip­
itate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a 
substitute for revolution,70
The primary inability of the Alliance to effect its explic­
it goals might be explained in terras of the innate impos­
sibility of those goals. Furthermore, the constant 
changes that occurred after 1961 in the definition of U.S. 
national interests, especially In the area of internation­
al security, contributed to the contradiction. As soon 
as foreign assistance to Northeast Brazil became identi­
fied with the war against communism, it became imperative 
for the sake of U.S. institutional coherence to use it as 
a weapon, and to destroy in many cases rather than to 
bulid with it.
Although some observers, including Huntington, 
indict the Alliance for Progress because of its contra­
dictory premises, they tend to identify the souce of 
the contradiction as implicit to the Charter of Punta del 
Este, and not reflective of a basic transformation of pol­
icy after the fact. Huntington emphasizes that "in fact, 
economic development and political stability are two in-
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dependent goals and progress toward one has no necessary
71connection with progress toward another." Officials 
charged with these unrelated goals soon realized their 
plight, and in the struggle to achieve coherent insti­
tutional functions that ensued, the primary goal of poli­
tical stability was affirmed. Since the goal of political 
stability did not, in this case, correspond with economic 
and social development goals agreed upon in the Charter 
of Punta del Este, efforts in these latter areas were in­
creasingly limited. Agrarian reform and education pro­
grams made way for high impact school construction program­
ing.
The Charter of Punta del Este, which brought 
about the Alliance for Progress, included concrete ob­
jectives which at least two critics are convinced "can
now be used as yardsticks against which to measure its 
72performance." The first of these was the achievement 
of an economic growth rate of "not less than 2.5 percent 
per capita per year." in each of the countries implement­
ing the program. This was seen at the time as a for­
midable challenge considering the Latin American popu­
lation growth rate of about 3 percent,^ and a population
growth rate in Northeast Brazil from 17.875 million in
7 k1950 to 22.427 million in i960.
A second objective stipulated in the Alliance 
charter was to provide "a more equitable distribution of
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75national income.” Still other objectives included 
trade diversification, greater use of Latin American hu­
man and natural resources, significant increases in per 
capita food production, agrarian reform, eradication of 
adult illiteracy, specific health goals(according to 
the needs of each country), and increased low-income 
housing.76
The first step toward achievement of all these objec­
tives was to be the formulation of national develop­
ment programs on the principles of self help and "the 
maximum use of domestic resources, taking into account 
the special conditions of each country," but including 
the "necessary structural reforms."77
A primary goal of the Alliance for Progress, the 
provision of political stability and hemispheric security, 
was not stated officially, but soon became apparent to 
many observers. Robock remarked that "by mid i960 the 
total of all United States and United Nations technical 
assistance to Northeast Brazil, the most extensive area 
of poverty in the Western Hemisphere, had increased to' 
the level of about fifteen technical experts and an annual 
expenditure of about $500,000." He added that "the pros-
7 ftpects for much greater United States help continued dim." 
However, i960 was coincidently the year that Fidel Castro 
made his political allegiance publicly known, and the 
gravitation of Cuba toward the Soviet bloc resulted in a 
dramatic change in U.S. attitudes toward Latin America. 
Northeast Brazil suddenly became an important laboratory
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for United States foreign policy techniques in the hemi­
sphere.
Northeast Brazil, almost by chance, became a "cause 
celebre." With the United States embassy, New York 
Times, and the National Broadcasting Company discov­
ery of "Marxist" Francisco Juiiao and the Peasant 
land reform movement in the Northeast, the stage was 
set by late i960 for Northeast Brazil to receive 
prompt and high level attention from the new admini­
stration. Almost immediately after President Ken­
nedy took office a series of urgent visits were made 
to the Northeast by White House officials, Adlai 
Stevenson, and others. Gelso Furtado, the head of 
SUDENE, was invited to Washington to confer with 
President Kennedy and others,'9
The United States later put aside $33 million for an im-
80mediate action program, and followup programs m  the 
Northeast lasted the duration of the Alliance.
It is doubtful even if the Alliance for Progress
was successful in accomplishing its unwritten goal of
mitigating the influence of castroism in Northeast Brazil.
The Alliance achieved a reputation during its decade of
existence for continually shifting its program emphasis,
but it is possible to say definitively political and
socioeconomic patterns in the Northeast remain relatively
/static. Levinson and Onis conclude that*
If it has succeeded in preventing any new Castros 
from coming to power in the hemisphere, it has done 
so by military means, failing conspicuously to ad­
vance the cause of the democratic left. The United 
States has intervened openly in the Dominican Re­
public, and less obviously in Brazil and Guatamala 
to assist not the democratic left but the military 
and civilian forces of conservatism.®1
Both the implicit and explicit goals of the Alliance seem
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to have eluded it during its decade of existence. Roett's
comment remains valid in retrospect.
The United States in the 1960s found itself in the 
awkward position of advocating political and social 
mobilization in underdeveloped nations while pos­
sessing and using foreign aid as an instrument to 
impede modernization inftthe name of national and 
international security. ^
Implications for the Future. The counterproductivity of 
the Alliance for Progress program in Northeast Brazil with 
regards to the specific aims of political and socio-econ­
omic development was probably due to the condition of 
competition generated between the U.S. program and the 
SUDENE. To argue that the Alliance for Progress contained 
a covert goal, one which it achieved with a reasonable 
degree of success, is to ignore the firm commitment that 
the United States made in the Charter of Punta del Este 
to take certain political risks for the sake of modernizing 
Latin American society. Although it has to be recognized 
that all nations, and especially the "superpowers", have 
specific national interests which must always prevail over 
their philanthropic enterprises, the procedures which led 
to the identification of those interests in Northeast 
Brazil can be said to have been both erroneous and dis­
parate. Robock underscored this point in his 1963 report.
With political goals being so important, the United 
States needs a clear picture of the Specific kinds of 
political developments in Northeast Brazil that would 
be considered successful foreign aid results. The de­
velopment of such criteria,requires, of course, a
12?
thorough knowledge of Brazil's political system and 
political styles, including a sophisticated and ob­
jective understanding of communism, left-wing move­
ments, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the roles 
of the church and the military within the Brazilian 
setting. To interpret Brazilian political events 
within the context of United States political stan­
dards and characteristics, for example, will result 
both in ineffective guidance for foreign aid actions 
and in erroneous evaluations of the resuits.^3
This straightforward articulation of the dangers of cul­
tural naivete on the part of U.S. foreign assistance 
officials in Northeast Brazil went unheeded. Buttressed
fwith vague allusions to "communist conspiracy" and politi­
cal "instability", the officials that determined the 
policy for the U.S. contribution to the development of 
the Northeast quickly discounted their official goals 
as pejorative to primary objectives.
The adoption of "high impact" programs by the 
USAID mission just prior to 1964 further underscores the 
lack of regard that officials had for the provisions of 
the Charter of Punta del Este. Robock discounts their 
utility.
The first objection to most impact projects is that 
they don't work. It is inconceivable that enough 
school buildings, electric light installations, water 
systems, and new housing units can be built in a 
short period of time to satisfy more than a minute 
share of total needs. Therefore, the assumption 
must be made that if the "have-not" sees the new 
physical facilities, he will be convinced that the 
development program he is being asked to support 
is eventually going to help him. The basic goal, 
therefore, involves expectations rather than im­
mediate fulfillment. And the Nordestino is cyni­
cal enough after many years of promised panaceas to 
need more than the sight of Senhor X— who generally
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has good political connections— getting new facilijr
ties to persuade him that his future is brighter.
It is therefore doubtful if the adoption of high impact 
policy in a region which had traditionally been glutted 
with this kind of governmental response evinced sound 
judgement on the part of the USAID officials.
The blind emphasis on regional development is ano­
ther way in which the Alliance for Progress, as a coordi­
nated institutional effort, ignored the basic requisites 
of political development in Northeast Brazil. United i 
States foreign assistance became incapable of assisting 
in the solution of the outstanding problems of the North­
east at precisely that juncture in which they were recog-, 
nized as exclusively regional in character. It is the 
national scope of most of the problems of the Northeast 
which identifies such plans as myopic and conciliatory.
In this context, it is unlikely that substantially in­
creased understanding and cooperation between the USAID 
mission to the Northeast and the SUDENE would have suf­
ficed in and of itself. National problems require nation­
al solutions. Nevertheless, the legacy of the period be­
tween 1961 and 196^ in Northeast Brazil is the imposition 
politics at the expense of political development, and a 
key experiment in political and socioeconomic change was 
consciously and effectively resisted despite the prepon­
derance of advice to the contrary.
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CHAPTER IV
POLITICS AND POVERTYt 
A CONCLUSION
This thesis has endeavored to explain why govern­
ment planning,in the areas of political and economic devel­
opment in Northeast Brazil has Been unable to address it­
self to the problems of poverty and privation in that 
region. The intensity and scope of these problems is 
dramatic, and the region can be compared with sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Indian subcontinent despite the growing 
opulence of Southern Brazil. The recurrent droughts, or 
secas, further intensify a situation which often leads to 
starvation and forced migration of the regions peasants 
to other areas. Powerful regional elites have tradition­
ally either resisted all government intervention or, as 
in the case of the sugar producers, made use of it solely 
for personal gain.
The primary focus of the analysi has been the 
Northeast Development Superintendency, or the SUDENE, an 
agency which was empowered in 1961, for the first time in 
the history of the Northeast, to renovate the region*s 
political and economic institutions. The subsequent
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inability of this agency to effect substantive political 
and economic change between 1961 and 1964 can be attribut­
ed to four primary factors* first, the structure of this 
agency was inextricably bound to competing regional inter­
ests; second, the scope of the problems to which it addres­
sed itself was, and continues to be, national, not region­
al; third, cultural limitations of the Brazilian bureau­
cracy, particularly that of personalism, deprived the 
SUDENE of dynamic leadership at a critical juncture; and 
fourth, competition between the U.S. development effort 
in Northeast Brazil deprived the SUDENE of critical sup­
port and exacerbated political tensions to which it had 
already become subjected.
The SUDENE was tied to competing regional inter­
ests in several ways. It was structurally committed to 
rely upon regional elites in its formulation of policy, - 
It depended upon region-wide cooperation in the implemen­
tation of its programs. Furthermore, by 1961 the small 
traditional elite of the Northeast had been challenged 
and defeated in several instances by populist politicians, 
and the SUDENE became a convenient target for both sides 
in the ensuing political struggles.
The poverty and privation of rural Brazil are not 
confined to its Northeast. In attempting to formulate 
regional solutions to these problems, the SUDENE was forc­
ed to observe national political rules without recourse to
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national resourses. It was therefore unable to im­
plement a comprehensive rural program in the region.
The SUDENE inevitably chose to follow the path of least 
resistance and implemented a program of tax write-offs 
and minor subsidization to corporations willing to 
expand into the Northeast. Brazilian industrialization, 
however, has had relatively little effect on the problems 
of the rural sector.
The cultural limitations of the Brazilian bureau­
cracy include the tendency to emphasize personalities ra­
ther than institutional functions. The dynamic leader­
ship of Celso Furtado, the founder and first superinten­
dent of the SUDENE, seriously jepordized the goals of the 
agency to the extent that it created a dependency in the 
agency on his continual presence. During the critical 
year of 1963* Furtado was absent for prolonged periods 
while he completed a five-year plan for Brazilian national 
economic development. At a time when the SUDENE was cal­
led upon to respond to a variety of pressures and criti­
cisms, it remained weakened and dormant.
Competition between the United States Agency for 
International Development mission to the Northeast and 
the SUDENE was based in part on all of the three weaknes­
ses mentioned above. Regional elites fostered American 
insecurities for the purpose of solidifying their own 
position. The national character of poverty and privation
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in Brazil led some American development strategists to 
identify nationalist tendencies as leftist "subversion**. 
The weaknesses of Brazilian bureaucracy, and particularly 
Furtado*s frequent absences, led to the growth of mis­
understanding between the two agencies. The Alliance 
officials came to view the SUDENE as either ignorant of, 
or threatening to, American ideals in the Northeast re­
gion. In fact, the United States was committed, through 
the Charter of Punta del Este, to support political and 
social development efforts, even at the expense of some 
degree of hemispheric "security". The inability of the 
U.S. foreign aid program to come to grips with the SUDENE 
plan was in large measure self defeating* the path taken 
neither strengthened "security" in the Northeast, nor did 
it make a rational use of American funds, as the school- 
building program indicated.
The breakdown of the SUDENE prior to 1964 has 
extensive implications with regards to regional develop­
ment planning in general. It indicates the need in Brazil 
above all else to give national recognition to problems 
that are essentially national in character; it implies the 
inability of regional programs to address themselves ef­
fectively to these problems. It emphasizes the funda­
mental difficulties in directing political and economic 
development through personalized bureaucracies. And it 
outlines the inability of foreign development efforts
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and specifically those of "superpowers"— to achieve their 
overall objectives while accommodating ulterior purposes, 
such as hemispheric "security".
The breakdown of the SUDENE prior to 1964 has 
meant, among other things, that the severe problems of 
the Northeast continue. The latifundio system of land 
ownership has persisted, and with it the social and po­
litical conditions for which the Northeast is notorious. 
The failure of the SUDENE has been followed by the 
failures of the Alliance for Progress, the GERAN, and 
numerous other development projects. Understanding the 
factors which led to this breakdown is of critical rele­
vance to a general understanding of why regional develop­
ment planning has been unable to alleviate the conditions 
of poverty and privation in Northeast Brazil.
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